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THE DUALITY OF FEDERALIST NATION-BUILDING: 
TWO STRAINS OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION CASES 
REVISITED 
Ming-sung Kuo* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 rekindled the 
national debate on the status of non-citizen immigrants in the 
United States.1  While the ostensible cause of this debate—a 
massive atrocity committed by non-U.S. citizens—is new, its 
substance is not.2  Over a century ago, two cases involving the 
constitutional status of Chinese immigrants in the United States 
marked the beginning of the modern constitutional debate over 
 
* LL.B. (1993), LL.M. (1997), National Taiwan University; LL.M. (2001), J.S.D. candidate, 
Yale Law School.  This Article derives from my research paper for the Advanced 
Constitutional Law Seminar of the 2001 spring semester at Yale Law School.  I owe special 
thanks to Professor Bruce Ackerman for his supervision and constant encouragement.  I 
would also like to thank Professor Paul W. Kahn for his comments on an early version of this 
article.  Finally, I am indebted to Catherine Corlett and Mackenzie Curtin with the Albany 
Law Review for their excellent work in editing this article.  All errors are my own. 
1 See, e.g., Chris Adams et al., Bush Seeks to Expand Legal Arsenal Against Terrorism: 
Congress is Eager to Act On Money-Laundering And Wiretap Measures, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 
2001, at A24, 2001 WL-WSJ 2875756 (reporting on the Bush Administration’s eagerness to 
expand federal use of wiretaps and money-laundering statutes to track potential foreign 
terrorists); John Mintz, Palestinian-Born Man Deported to Jordan; Technician Accused of 
Immigration Fraud; Lawyer Fears Torture in Amman, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at A29, 
2001 WL 30329104 (detailing the outrage surrounding the deportation of a Palestinian-born 
man from the United States who was suspected of having connections with terrorists). 
2 See generally ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN 
U.S. HISTORY 1 (1997) (acknowledging that tension among racial and ethnic groups is not a 
recent development in the United States).  See also Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Book Note, 
Immigrants and the Civil Rights Regime: Parens Patriae Standing, Foreign Governments and 
Protection from Private Discrimination, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 408, 420–21 (2002) (comparing 
the hostility directed at Japanese-Americans following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor with 
the animus targeted at Arabs and Muslims since the terrorist attacks of September 11). 
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immigration.3  Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, also known as the Chinese Exclusion Case, each influenced 
subsequent constitutional developments, although the decisions in 
these cases were starkly divergent.4  In the 1886 decision Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, the Supreme Court unanimously decided to uphold the 
equal protection claims of two non-citizen Chinese immigrants.  The 
immigrants were arrested for operating laundries without obtaining 
special consent, despite the prevalence of non-Chinese laundry 
operators who conducted their businesses in the same manner.5  
Three years later, the Court also unanimously decided the Chinese 
Exclusion Case.  Despite the structural similarity and chronological 
proximity to Yick Wo, however, the substantive result of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case was in stark contrast to its predecessor.6  In the 
Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court affirmed the inherent power of 
Congress to exclude a non-citizen Chinese immigrant from re-
entering the United States.7  In the earlier case, the non-citizen 
plaintiffs were treated as equal to American citizens, while in the 
 
3 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese 
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  These two cases can also shed light on the role that 
racism and ethnicity have historically played in both legislative and judicial decisions.  See 
IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 37–39 (1996) 
(exposing that although Congress limited racially discriminatory immigration laws in 1965, 
the prejudicial effects of the Chinese cases have not been overturned by the Supreme Court or 
Congress).  This article focuses specifically on the Chinese because among all of the non-white 
races, the Chinese had been perceived as “so different” from Americans, even by the most 
liberal of judges.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  See 
Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
151, 156, 159 (1996) (revealing that even a recognized liberal such as Justice John Marshall 
Harlan expressed a belief that the Chinese were unable to assimilate and that the presence of 
the Chinese would pose a danger to the American public).  This perceived extreme difference 
of the Chinese provides us with a better understanding of the immigration laws of the 1880s. 
4 Both Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case are still regarded as “good law” by the 
Supreme Court.  Nevertheless, Yick Wo has been praised as the pioneer in providing 
constitutional protection to aliens, while the Chinese Exclusion Case is considered one of the 
worst decisions in Supreme Court history.  See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United 
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 
859 (1987) [hereinafter Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty] (lamenting 
that the doctrine that emerged from the Chinese Exclusion Case encouraged “paranoia, 
xenophobia, and racism”); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 566 
(1990) (reiterating that Yick Wo left a legacy based on the idea that all individuals—
regardless of status—are protected by fundamental human rights). 
5 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359. 
6 Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case were decided in 1886 and 1889, respectively.  
The two cases are structurally similar in that they both involve non-citizens seeking judicial 
redress for alleged violations of their civil rights. 
7 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 589, 611.  See infra text accompanying notes 42–
45 (discussing the plenary power of Congress to exclude immigrants as stated in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case). 
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later the Chinese plaintiff was seen as nothing but a pariah, 
completely subject to the sovereign power of the United States.  The 
focus of this article is how these two cases, so similar on the surface, 
resulted in such different outcomes.  In response to this quandary, 
the course of nation-building in the United States and its connection 
to American constitutional law will be examined.8 
This is certainly not the first analysis of the relationship between 
Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case, nor the first observation of 
the significance of these cases in the course of American nation-
building.9  Nevertheless, as of yet no such analysis has produced a 
comprehensive picture.10  Some scholarship has been devoted to 
explaining Yick Wo’s role in the development of substantive due 
process and equal protection for resident aliens.11  By comparison, 
 
8 For a definition and discussion of the notion of nation-building, see infra text 
accompanying notes 99–101. 
9 See e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, 
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
121–22, 263–64 (2002) (chronicling the Supreme Court’s doctrinal shift toward inherent 
power). 
10  Professor Cleveland also tries to give a comprehensive account of Yick Wo and the 
Chinese Exclusion Case by considering them within the field of immigration.  In doing so, 
however, she still reaches a dichotomous conclusion regarding these two cases.  She argues 
that “Yick Wo stands as one of the late-nineteenth-century [Supreme] Court’s most powerful 
affirmations of the liberal, egalitarian vision of the Constitution.”  Cleveland, supra note 9, at 
119.  However, Professor Cleveland also argues that Justice Field, the authoring Justice in 
the Chinese Exclusion Case, “opened his opinion with an overtly nativist and ascriptivist 
explanation of the government’s efforts to regulate Chinese immigration.” Id. at 129 
(emphasis added). 
11 See, e.g.,  David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 211, 231 (1999) [hereinafter Bernstein, The Chinese Laundry Cases] (stating 
that in Yick Wo, the federal court repealed anti-Chinese legislation based on violations of 
Chinese immigrants’ Fourteenth Amendment rights); Thomas Wuil Joo, New “Conspiracy 
Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment: Nineteenth Century Chinese Civil Rights Cases and the 
Development of Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 355 (1995) 
(arguing that the rights afforded Chinese aliens resulted primarily from the desire of federal 
jurists to extend the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment to economic liberty, as opposed to 
an actual fight against state discrimination against the Chinese); David E. Bernstein, The 
Supreme Court and “Civil Rights,” 1886-1908, 100 YALE L.J. 725, 743–44 (1990) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Civil Rights] (contending that the fundamental right of occupational freedom, as 
expressed in Yick Wo, has not survived, while the equal protection tradition of Yick Wo lives 
on).  See also William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the 
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 781 n.36 (1985) (arguing that although Yick Wo is 
typically characterized as a race discrimination case, it truly dealt with the right to “pursue 
an ordinary and harmless calling” as protected by substantive due process).  For a discussion 
of the role that Yick Wo played in the protection of non-citizen immigrants, see, e.g., LOUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 293–94, 536 n.44 (2d ed. 
1996) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS] (citing Yick Wo as support for the proposition 
that aliens are entitled to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment); 
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 61–62 (1996) (stating that Yick Wo clearly held that aliens deserved the 
protections provided for by the Constitution); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of 
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scholarly analysis of the Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny 
has focused on major immigration law and foreign affairs topics 
such as national security, national independence and Congress’s 
near absolute authority over immigration matters.12  Independently, 
the two types of “Chinese immigration cases” have been fully 
explored and have made significant contributions to fundamental 
rights, equal protection and foreign affairs jurisprudence. 
This article seeks to achieve a comprehensive reading and 
reconciliation of the two strands of “Chinese immigration cases”.  
This new perspective can enhance our understanding of both 
American constitutional development in the 1880s and the notion of 
nation-building.13  The duality of federalist nation-building provides 
the cornerstone for this comprehensive overview of Yick Wo and the 
Chinese Exclusion Case.  The Yick Wo decision emerged from the 
internal dimension of a federalist nation-building era in which the 
federal government tried to hold its member states at bay.  The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, however, expresses both the internal and 
external dimensions of this nation-building process through its 
emphasis on national sovereignty. 
While Part I of this article briefly summarized the current 
tendency to separate the analysis of these landmark cases, Part II 
describes the inadequacy of the traditional dichotomous accounts of 
Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case.  From the perspective of 
constitutional development, these accounts include three defects: 
 
Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 862, 864 (1989) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Federal 
Regulation of Aliens] (indicating that the Court in Yick Wo decided that aliens were protected 
from unfavorable state regulations by the Fourteenth Amendment); Linda S. Bosniak, 
Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United 
States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 974 (1988) (reasoning that Yick Wo demonstrated that 
personhood, not status as a citizen of the United States, is the test to qualify for protection 
under the Due Process Clause). 
12 See, e.g., HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 11, at 16 (reiterating the Court’s 
conclusion in the Chinese Exclusion Case that the plenary power of Congress to regulate 
aliens is derived from the status of the United States as an “independent nation”); NEUMAN, 
supra note 11, at 119 (noting that the Chinese Exclusion Case upheld Congress’s preclusion of 
Chinese immigrants from entering or re-entering the United States); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-18, at 972–73 n.43 (3d ed. 2000) (citing the Chinese 
Exclusion Case for the maxim that Congress has virtually unlimited power over immigration 
issues).  See also Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 11, at 862; T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 11–12 
(1990) [hereinafter Aleinikoff, Citizens and the Constitution]; Bosniak, supra note 11, at 968; 
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 857; Meredith K. 
Olafson, Book Note, The Concept of Limited Sovereignty and the Immigration Law Plenary 
Power Doctrine, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433, 435–36 (1998); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the 
Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965, 967 (1993). 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 101–29 (analyzing the relationship between the 
holdings of Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case and nation-building). 
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academic irresponsibility, insufficiency, and complete discontinuity.  
Therefore, a proper analysis requires an approach from a nation-
building perspective. 
Part III discusses the course of American nation-building during 
the 1880s as well as the two-dimensional national buildup of that 
period.  When viewed against the backdrop of American nation-
building in the 1880s, Yick Wo can be interpreted as a deployment 
of federal judicial sovereignty.14  In the same context, the Chinese 
Exclusion Case epitomizes the soaring drive for nation-state 
sovereignty in the late 19th century.15  Both demonstrate the 
trend—popular at the time the cases were decided—of attempting to 
strengthen the national image of the United States at home and 
abroad. 
II.  THE INADEQUACY OF THE DICHOTOMY TENDENCY 
Current legal literature tends to deal with Yick Wo and the 
Chinese Exclusion Case separately, a trend that shall be referred to 
as “the dichotomy tendency.”16  Irrespective of the nuanced 
differences in the various dichotomy strands, the common 
characteristic is to place these two cases in different categories of 
constitutional law.  In other words, “constitutional law” is the only 
link between Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case.  The 
remainder of this section offers an overview and critique of the 
tendency among legal scholars to dichotomize these two cases. 
A.  The Dichotomy Tendency: Two Varieties 
Two dichotomous analyses of Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion 
Case exist: irrelevance and bifurcation. 
1.  The Irrelevance Perspective 
In this analysis, Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case are 
presented as falling into two distinct categories, irrelevant to each 
other.17  The former falls in the category of fundamental rights; the 
 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 224–40 (examining the issue of sovereignty with Yick 
Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case). 
15 Id. 
16 The following perspectives on Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case do not necessarily 
put the two cases together.  To demonstrate the possible problems that are created and 
ignored by the current approach taken by legal scholars, this article organizes the existing 
perspectives in a manner which highlights those issues. 
17 Compare Joo, supra note 11, at 387 (arguing that Yick Wo, in addition to being a case 
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latter resides in the field of governmental power.18  While Yick Wo is 
viewed as the precursor to the Lochner ideal of protecting economic 
liberty,19 the Chinese Exclusion Case is held up as the cornerstone of 
the modern plenary power doctrine in the area of foreign affairs.20  
Because of the tenuous relationship between economic regulation 
(the perspective through which Yick Wo is commonly viewed) and 
foreign affairs (the perspective through which the Chinese Exclusion 
Case is commonly viewed) in American constitutional 
jurisprudence,21 this analysis will be termed “the irrelevance 
version.” 
a.  Yick Wo as the Antecedent of Economic Liberty 
From the irrelevance perspective, Yick Wo is a typical case 
involving fundamental rights.  Nevertheless, the significance of Yick 
Wo to fundamental rights is not comprehensive, but specific.  
Despite the Court’s explicit invocation of the Equal Protection 
 
about Equal Protection, was the first opinion of the Supreme Court to hold an economic 
regulation unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause), with Bernstein, The Chinese 
Laundry Cases, supra note 11, at 212, 283–85, 294 (presenting the theory that the Chinese 
laundry cases, specifically Yick Wo, were decided based on the right to labor which is 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).  Cf. Bernstein, Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 726 
(emphasizing that despite the opinions of the Supreme Court, there was not a true difference 
between cases concerning economic liberty and those dealing with equal rights).  Strictly 
speaking, the irrelevance version exists as an effect of the writings which argue that Yick Wo 
is the precursor of economic freedom.  Given that scholars categorize Yick Wo as a case to be 
examined in relation to the development of substantive due process, the Chinese Exclusion 
Case is absent from their discussions.  In Professor Haney López’s discussion of the legal 
restrictions placed on citizenship, the Chinese Exclusion Case was discussed, but Yick Wo was 
not addressed.  HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 3, at 37–39, 236 n.10. 
18 Fundamental rights and governmental power have been recognized as the two 
constituent parts of a constitution.  See ULRICH K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: 
THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS 5–6 [hereinafter PREUSS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION] (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1995) (recognizing that a 
cohesive nation is one that has a strong, law-making government as well as individual 
freedoms for the people). 
19 See Bernstein, The Chinese Laundry Cases, supra note 11, at 212 (stating that some of 
the Chinese laundry cases “anticipated Lochner’s reasoning and rhetoric”); Joo, supra note 11, 
at 354–56 (arguing that after Yick Wo, the Court emphasized economic rights for all 
American citizens); Bernstein, Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 727 (averring that the essence 
of Yick Wo was that “[a]n individual of any race had the right to control his labor free from 
government interference and to be free from discriminatory treatment by the government”). 
20 See Olafson, supra note 12, at 437–38 (linking the power Congress has over foreign 
affairs and immigration to the notion of national sovereignty); James A. R. Nafziger, The 
General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 804, 824–25 (1983) 
(recognizing that the Chinese Exclusion Case provided Congress with power over immigration 
which is limited by the Constitution, public policy, and the interests of justice). 
21 Economic regulation may have to do with foreign affairs inasmuch as the concept of 
economic regulation extends to “regulat[ing] Commerce with foreign Nations.” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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Clause to strike down the disputed municipal ordinance in Yick 
Wo,22 legal scholarship has tended to overlook this aspect of the 
case.  Thus, Yick Wo was the predecessor of cases that examined 
substantive due process issues irrespective of the Equal Protection 
Clause.23 
The plausibility of this irrelevance reading of Yick Wo seems to be 
based on the following rationale.  First, the catchall nature of the 
Equal Protection Clause makes it possible to ignore the Court’s 
opinion concerning the textual foundation of its decisions.  Although 
the Equal Protection Clause coexists with other constitutional 
provisions, it is more formal than substantive.24  All equal 
protection cases simultaneously entail substantive rights.25  Thus, 
some legal scholars have found room to establish the irrelevance 
version of Yick Wo outside the purview of equal protection.  Ignoring 
the Court’s explicit reference to the Equal Protection Clause in 
deciding the constitutionality of the municipal regulation at issue, 
the irrelevance perspective dismisses this aspect of the case as 
rhetorical and empty.  Under the irrelevance perspective, the issue 
was the Court’s due process analysis.26 
In addition to the structural nature of equal protection, the facts 
of Yick Wo and the Court’s reasoning give material support to the 
irrelevance perspective.  The contested right in Yick Wo was the 
right of the plaintiffs to run their laundry free from the arbitrary 
and unregulated discretion of the Board of Supervisors of San 
Francisco.27  This occupational freedom falls into the category of 
economic liberty.28  The Court took this position by acknowledging 
that the disputed ordinance constituted a prohibition of the 
 
22 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369–70 (1886). 
23 See Joo, supra note 11, at 387 (noting that Yick Wo was the first case to invalidate an 
economic regulation for violating the Fourteenth Amendment). 
24 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 772–73 & n.109 (1999) 
(arguing that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to elaborate on due process, not to be 
a separate idea). 
25 See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 301 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(stating that a determination of the nature of the substantive right must be made before an 
equal protection analysis can proceed); James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the 
Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. 
PA. L. REV. 893, 973–74 (1997) (indicating that an equal protection analysis rests upon “some 
substantive conception of rights or justice”). 
26 Cf. Joo, supra note 11, at 388 (arguing that Yick Wo and other Chinese cases are better 
described as substantive due process cases). 
27 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 366. 
28 See Bernstein, The Chinese Laundry Cases, supra note 11, at 294 (noting that the judges 
in the Chinese laundry cases protected the occupational liberty of the Chinese, despite their 
own personal prejudices); Bernstein, Civil Rights, supra note 11, at 726 (explaining that the 
Yick Wo court upheld the plaintiffs’ economic rights). 
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plaintiffs’ occupation, and the destruction of the their business and 
property.29 
Supporters of the irrelevance version of Yick Wo also look for 
support beyond the text of the Court’s opinion.  They look to the 
contemporaneous related opinions of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes San Francisco, where the 
conduct at issue in Yick Wo took place.  Based on the fact that the 
Ninth Circuit Chinese cases generally involved state interference 
with property or contracts, it is conceivable that Yick Wo was a case 
of the same kind.30  Furthermore, one of the justices hearing Yick 
Wo, Justice Stephen Field, had been a chief defender of property 
rights and freedom of contract on the Ninth Circuit before he was 
appointed to the Supreme Court in 1863.31  The fact that Field 
joined the decision in Yick Wo suggests that his primary stance on 
private economic liberty was not compromised by Justice Matthew’s 
opinion.  Yick Wo is accordingly interpreted by this school as a case 
of substantive due process instead of one of equal protection.32 
Other scholars who support the irrelevance perspective have 
approached the issue from a sociological point of view.  According to 
this view, the rights created by the Civil War Amendments were 
restricted to blacks.  If non-blacks were to benefit, they needed to 
show that the Civil War Amendments did not intend otherwise.33  
Thus, as the Equal Protection Clause was enacted in response to the 
atrocities inflicted on blacks by southern states in the years 
following the Civil War, the argument goes that it did not protect 
the Chinese.34  As a consequence, the other major commitment of 
Reconstruction—free labor—emerged as the chief constitutional 
protection of non-black people.  Along this vein of interpretation, 
 
29 See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368 (noting that the ordinance in question allowed the local 
government to arbitrarily keep individuals from pursuing their professions). 
30 See Joo, supra note 11, at 369–70 (contending that the Ninth Circuit judges’ decisions in 
the Chinese cases can be explained as examples of economic rights jurisprudence). 
31 See id. at 370 (suggesting that Justice Field used the Chinese civil rights cases to 
establish his view that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited state interference with 
economic rights). 
32 Id. (recognizing, however, that Yick Wo has been cited for both equal protection and due 
process principles). 
33 See RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 152–53 (1999) (stating 
that in order to benefit from the Civil War Amendments, Asian-Americans exploited the 
Amendment’s commitment to free labor). 
34 See id. (arguing that Yick Wo was decided because of a non-racial issue—free labor); see 
also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 34–36 (1986) (illustrating that the Fourteenth Amendment was a 
response to southern states enacting Black Codes and vagrancy laws designed to deprive 
blacks of basic liberties enjoyed by whites and northern blacks). 
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Yick Wo set the example for free labor cases, which were entangled 
with economic liberty.35  The plaintiffs’ racial identity was simply 
incidental.36 
b.  The Chinese Exclusion Case as the Landmark in Foreign 
Affairs 
According to the irrelevance perspective, the Chinese Exclusion 
Case finds its significance in the constitutional context of 
governmental power, especially foreign affairs.37  The Court, in this 
case, assumed that Congress held plenary power to conduct foreign 
affairs based on the nationhood and sovereignty of the United 
States.  Since the Court focused on governmental power over foreign 
affairs, the rights of the plaintiff were effectively ignored. 
The Court’s opinion is the most visible evidence of this 
interpretation of the Chinese Exclusion Case.  For the most part, the 
Court focused on the power to exclude aliens and the related issue 
of the constitutional status of treaties.38  Through the lens of the 
irrelevance analysis, the plaintiff’s claim that his right to liberty 
had been violated seemed dispensable.  In contrast to Yick Wo, the 
Court seemed to hold the position that, insomuch as the claimant 
was an alien, his rights did not deserve consideration. 39  This 
shifted the focus to the Federal government’s power to exclude 
aliens.40  According to the Court, the power to exclude aliens was 
unlimited and stemmed from the idea that an independent nation 
 
35 See Bernstein, The Chinese Laundry Cases, supra note 11, at 284 (illustrating that the 
Chinese laundry cases evidenced the courts’ commitment to free labor and natural rights); see 
also Forbath, supra note 11, at 781 n.36 (suggesting that what was discriminatorily denied in 
Yick Wo was the right to “pursue an ordinary and harmless calling”). 
36 PRIMUS, supra note 33, at 153. 
37 See TRIBE, supra note 12, § 5-18, at 967–68 & n.15, 972–73 & n.43 (discussing 
government control over immigration issues); Nafziger, supra note 20, at 824–25 (noting that 
the Chinese Exclusion Case established Congress’s plenary power to exclude aliens and 
abrogate treaties); Olafson, supra note 12, at 438 (explaining that the federal government’s 
absolute power over immigration was secured by the Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case). 
38 In the Chinese Exclusion Case, one of the strongest claims made by the plaintiff was that 
the Chinese Exclusion Act of October 1, 1888 was in violation of the Treaty of 1880.  Thus, the 
central issue was whether the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888 could constitutionally trump the 
Treaty of 1880.  See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600–01 (1889). 
39 See id. at 603 (refusing to examine the plaintiff’s rights because he was “not [a citizen] of 
the United States”). 
40 See id. (stating, “[t]hat the government of the United States . . . can exclude aliens from 
its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy”).  Moreover, the Court 
eliminated any possible controversy by holding that such a power was “exclusive and 
absolute.”  Id. at 604 (quoting Justice Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)). 
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has necessary jurisdiction over its own territory.41  Put in another 
way, “[i]f . . . [the United States] could not exclude aliens it would be 
to that extent subject to the control of another power.”42 
Also worthy of discussion is how the Court in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case granted Congress the power to exclude aliens.  
Unquestionably, not every Congressional power is enumerated in 
the text of the Constitution.  However, the framers addressed this 
problem when they incorporated the Necessary and Proper Clause 
in Article I.43  With regard to immigration, the power to regulate in 
general, and to exclude aliens in particular, may be inferred from 
both the Necessary and Proper Clause and the naturalization power 
of Article I, section 8, clause 4.44  Nevertheless, the Court in the 
Chinese Exclusion Case disregarded these constitutional provisions 
in favor of basing the power to exclude aliens on the precepts of 
nationhood and sovereignty.  A comparison of the Court’s 
construction of sovereignty with the constitutional provision of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause reveals the impact of this choice.  In 
the Court’s opinion, the power to exclude aliens inferred from 
national sovereignty would know no limits.45  In contrast, any power 
based on the Necessary and Proper Clause was not limitless, rather 
it is constitutional only insofar as the alleged power is “necessary 
and proper” to the implementation of the invoked authorization 
specified in Article I.46  In other words, justifying the power to 
exclude aliens on the basis of sovereignty rather than on the basis of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause strengthened Congressional 
power. 
2.  The Bifurcation Version 




43 “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 18. 
44 “To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4.  But see 
Cleveland, supra note 9, at 81 (arguing that the Naturalization Clause “most clearly 
addresses questions of citizenship, not admission and expulsion of aliens”). 
45 See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 4, at 859 
(stating that the Chinese Exclusion Case “ha[s] been taken to mean that there are no 
constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to regulate immigration”); see also TRIBE, 
supra note 12, § 5-3, at 807 (noting that the inherent power doctrine gives Congress largely 
unlimited power in the realm of foreign affairs). 
46 See TRIBE, supra note 12, § 5-3, at 798–99 (describing the debate over the Necessary and 
Proper clause between Hamilton, who interpreted the word “necessary” liberally, and 
Jefferson, who preferred a stricter interpretation). 
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places Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case into the same 
doctrinal category of immigration and citizenship.47  However, this 
version dichotomizes the cases along the two dimensions of the 
constitutional status of aliens. 48  While Yick Wo was concerned with 
the internal dimension of the rights of resident aliens guaranteed 
by the Constitution, the Chinese Exclusion Case addressed the 
external dimension of the admission and exclusion of aliens based 
on Congress’s plenary power to do so.49  Thus, based on the opposing 
attitudes towards the treatment of aliens exemplified by these two 
cases, “the bifurcation version” of the dichotomy narrative is aptly 
named. 
a.  Yick Wo as the Liberal Pioneer 
In contrast to the irrelevance account that distances Yick Wo from 
the Court’s explicit reference to the Equal Protection Clause, the 
bifurcation perspective claims that Yick Wo was a pioneer of modern 
equal protection jurisprudence.50 
 
47 Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 11, at 865–66 (concluding that Yick 
Wo’s descendants continue to give aliens constitutional protection, while those of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case allow federal immigration regulations to be conducted almost without 
restriction); Bosniak, supra note 11, at 968 n.35, 974 n.66 (citing the Chinese Exclusion Case 
in support of the idea that all sovereign nations have the authority to exclude or include non-
citizens, and mentioning Yick Wo to substantiate the argument that citizenship is not 
necessary in order for one to be afforded the protections of the Due Process Clause).  This 
doctrinal categorization is built on the Court’s highlighting of the plaintiffs’ identity at the 
outset of these two cases. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 358 (1886); The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889). 
48 According to Professor Aleinikoff, “the two lines of cases . . . reflect conflicting strands 
in . . . [American] constitutionalism: one concerned with affirming the importance of 
membership in a national community; the other pursuing a notion of fundamental human 
rights that protects individuals regardless of their status.” Aleinikoff, Citizens and the 
Constitution, supra note 12, at 19 (alteration in original).  For the equal protection reading of 
Yick Wo, see NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 62 (describing how Yick Wo unequivocally declared 
that aliens deserved all of the protections provided by the Equal Protection Clause).  But cf. 
Motomura, supra note 4, at 583–84 (distinguishing Yick Wo, a racial equal protection case, 
from alien equal protection cases).  For a discussion on the current relevance of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, see NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 119–22 (asserting that instead of recognizing 
immigration control as an enumerated power of Congress, the Chinese Exclusion Case treated 
it as an “extraconstitutional” power intrinsic to nationhood); Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of 
Aliens, supra note 11, at 862–63 (describing the Chinese Exclusion Case as “confirm[ing] 
congressional authority to prevent aliens from entering”). 
49 As Professor Aleinikoff points out, 
[a] full description of the constitutional status of aliens at the end of the 19th century 
would . . . identify two norms: (1) as to matters relating to admission and expulsion, 
Congress possessed ‘plenary’ power virtually unfettered by the Constitution; and (2) 
resident aliens could invoke constitutional protections in situations where citizens would 
be entitled to such protections . . . . 
Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 11, at 864–65. 
50 See NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 62 (declaring that Yick Wo “settled” the principle of 
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This liberal reading of Yick Wo finds its support in the text.  The 
Court not only protected the plaintiffs’ rights according to the Equal 
Protection Clause, but it also took steps to advance the progressive 
idea of equal protection.  It acknowledged that “[t]he rights of the 
petitioners . . . are not less, because they are aliens and subjects of 
the Emperor of China.”51  In addition, the Court acknowledged that 
“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to 
the protection of citizens.”52  In other words, non-citizens—aliens 
included—were eligible for protection under the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Hence, in 
the Court’s opinion, these two clauses “are universal in their 
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without 
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the 
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal 
laws.”53  Additionally, the Court held that “[t]he questions we have 
to consider and decide . . . are to be treated as involving the rights of 
every citizen of the United States equally with those of the 
strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court.”54  
Moreover, the Court also addressed the concept of equal protection 
from a historical point of view with respect to the evolution of the 
Constitution.  The Court demonstrated this evolutionary approach 
by attributing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to “the victorious progress of the race.”55  Thus, the 
plaintiffs’ identity as Chinese immigrants did not affect their 
constitutional rights to equal protection. 
Based on the Court’s opinion, the bifurcation version of Yick Wo 
argues that “it is fair to conclude that Congress, in keeping with the 
American tradition of trying to assimilate those aliens we choose to 
admit, treats most resident aliens with a considerable degree of 
concern and respect.”56  Thus, Yick Wo portrays the bright side of 
the status of aliens in 19th century America.57 
 
universal protection of the law for “persons within the United States”); SMITH, supra note 2, 
at 441 (claiming that cases such as Yick Wo “genuinely served liberal, inclusive positions”); 
Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 11, at 864–65 (acknowledging Yick Wo’s 
holding that aliens were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and noting that its legacy 
was built upon throughout the 20th century); Cleveland, supra note 9, at 119 (calling Yick Wo 
one of the Court’s “most powerful affirmations of the liberal, egalitarian vision of the 
Constitution”). 
51 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368. 
52 Id. at 369. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 370. 
56 Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 11, at 866. 
57 See id. at 864 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized important rights for 
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b.  The Chinese Exclusion Case as a Mirror of the Court’s 
Racism 
In the constitutional area of immigration and citizenship, the 
Chinese Exclusion Case has been condemned as one of the most 
notorious cases of racism.58  The Court has also been criticized for 
its unreserved affirmation of Congressional power to exclude 
aliens.59 
The text of the Court’s opinion in the Chinese Exclusion Case 
supports the charge of racism.  The Court reflected the racist 
atmosphere of the 1880s in validating the restrictive Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1888.  In its opinion, the Court gave a full account 
of the widespread racist sentiment against Chinese laborers.60  The 
Court discussed California’s assertions that the “[o]riental invasion” 
was detrimental to the material interests of the state, and public 
morals, claiming Chinese immigrants refused to adopt or adapt to 
American culture.61Mirroring the racist view of west coast citizens, 
the Court also stated that “[i]t seemed impossible for . . . [the 
Chinese] to assimilate with our people or to make any change in 
their habits or modes of living.”62  Thus, in taking this 
assimilationist stance, the Court adopted Congress’s fear of “the 
presence of foreigners of a different race . . . who [would] not 
assimilate.”63 
In addition to its view that the Chinese segregated themselves 
from Americans, the Court’s opinion also revealed its support for 
imperialism.64  Although the Chinese Exclusion Act was originally 
 
aliens, regardless of the constitutional law in strict immigration cases). 
58 See Aleinikoff, Citizens and the Constitution, supra note 12, at 11–12 (conceding that 
tracing the immigration cases to their 19th century roots would be “an embarrassment to 
constitutional law,” and citing the Chinese Exclusion Case for upholding the disgraceful laws 
against the Chinese).  See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The “Reticent” Minority and 
their Paradoxes, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1994) (suggesting that the Chinese 
Exclusion Case reflected the anti-Asian beliefs of some jurists); Cleveland, supra note 9, at 
124–34 (providing an in-depth discussion of the original Chinese exclusion case, Chae Chan 
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), and criticizing Justice Field for developing and 
supporting a theory that was not founded in the Constitution); NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 
119 (suggesting that the Chinese Exclusion Case was based on racist beliefs). 
59 See Aleinikoff, Citizens and the Constitution, supra note 12, at 11. 
60 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 593–96 (noting that the anti-Chinese 
sentiment was based primarily on the fact that Chinese laborers would work for far less 
compensation than American laborers). 
61 Id. at 595 (urging that Chinese laborers “remained strangers in the land, residing apart 
by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country”). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 606 (emphasis added). 
64 After briefing the facts of this case, the Court stated, “It will serve to present with 
greater clearness the nature and force of the objections to the act, if a brief statement be 
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enacted in 1882 and this case occurred in 1888, the context set by 
Justice Field traced back to 1843 when Congress authorized 
President Tyler to forge a commercial relationship with China.65  In 
narrating the history of the bilateral relations, the Court’s opinion 
essentially resulted in a report of the competition and cooperation 
among imperialists for their national interests in China.66  These 
bilateral relations, starting with American intervention in China, 
provided the foundation for later treaties and related legislation.  
Thus, the compassion of the United States toward China until 1888 
was directly related to the desire to pursue commercial interests in 
China.67  Therefore the benefits Chinese laborers experienced from 
the pre-1888 legislation were only largess, not rights in nature.  
When the intrinsic differences of race became visible, the host’s 
good will and friendship vanished.68  Implicit in the tone set by this 
frame of reference is a kind of “compassionate racism.” 
B.  Beyond the Dichotomy Tendency Myth 
These dichotomous accounts of Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case seem plausible because they reflect the reasoning of 
different legal areas.69  However, from an epistemological point of 
view, conceptual categories in jurisprudence are not a priori, but 
rather are artificially constructed.70  Thus, the doctrinal 
categorization cannot be taken as a given, but rather, requires 
critical reflection. 
A cultural study of law exposes that the rule of law is a symbolic 
 
made of the general character of the treaties between the two countries and of the legislation 
of Congress to carry them into execution.” Id. at 589. 
65 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 590 (indicating that the China/United 
States treaty was forged in response to a similar treaty between China and England, giving 
British subjects in China special privileges). 
66 Id. at 592 (explaining that it was not until the treaty of 1868 that free migration was 
encouraged between China and the United States). 
67 See id. at 592, 594 (exposing the fact that the first two treaties between the United 
States and China never discussed emigration or migration between the two nations). 
68 See id. at 595 (stating that “[t]he differences of race added greatly to the 
difficulties. . . .”). 
69 See generally Alessandro Pizzorusso, The Law-Making Process as a Juridical and 
Political Activity, in LAW IN THE MAKING: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 1, 36–37 (Alessandro 
Pizzorusso ed., 1988) (stating that the categorization has been a major technique in legal 
reasoning). 
70 See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 39–40 (2000) 
(explaining that categories are the result of the human imagination and from “the storehouse 
of any culture’s ways of construing the world”); N.E. Simmonds, Protestant Jurisprudence and 
Modern Doctrinal Scholarship, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 271, 274 (2001) (illustrating that 
categories are employed to provide a conceptual framework within which doctrinal scholars 
may consider information). 
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form through which people in a political community organize their 
opinions and conduct their lives.71  Accordingly, there must be a 
connection between the decisions of courts and the social setting in 
which they are situated.  If the decisions of courts are completely 
out of tune with their external context, the decisions are 
problematic.  On the other hand, every court decision does not have 
to be interpreted retrospectively as a whole.  Decisions may be 
divided into several parts to match related areas—which has been 
the trend in the legal profession.72  Nevertheless, if interpretations 
of a case diverge tremendously, the very difference between those 
readings creates theoretical doubt.  Thus, the enormous divergence 
between traditional interpretations of Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, coupled with the disparity between the dichotomous 
versions of these cases and their social setting, demonstrates a need 
to go beyond the dichotomy tendency. 
The next section contrasts the two cases and highlights the 
inadequacy of both dichotomous accounts.  First, it will expose the 
weakness of the dichotomy narratives from both the “responsibility 
of scholarship” and the “sufficiency of theory” perspective.  Then, it 
will illustrate these dichotomous narratives as a paradigm shift in 
the development of American constitutional law—the exploration of 
which makes an alternative view possible. 
1.  The Academic Irresponsibility of the Dichotomy Myth 
The responsibility of scholars in interpreting judicial decisions in 
a particular case is different from a practitioner’s invocation of that 
same case.  For a practitioner, his reference to a case is done solely 
for the purposes of appealing to or interpreting from an 
authoritative position, which is intended to win a suit or other 
proceeding.73  The practitioner is fairly justified in appealing to one 
aspect of a case, even at the expense of another.  For a legal scholar, 
 
71 See PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP 6 (1999) [hereinafter KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW] (declaring that the 
“[t]he rule of law is neither a matter of revealed truth nor of natural order . . . [rather] [i]t is a 
way of organizing a society . . .”); Paul W. Kahn, Freedom, Autonomy, and the Cultural Study 
of Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 141, 156, 160 (2001) (explaining that symbolic legal forms 
compete with other, non-legal symbolic forms to construct societies as we understand them). 
72 See KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 71, at 54 (arguing that “[t]he 
history of law’s rule . . . is a collection of interpretive commentaries”). 
73 See Michele Taruffo, Institutional Factors Influencing Precedents, in INTERPRETING 
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 437, 455 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers 
eds., 1997) (alluding to the fact that precedents are often quoted by practitioners solely for the 
purpose of supporting one’s position, but not for the purpose of developing supportive 
arguments). 
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however, a critical distance from legal practice is necessary in 
seeking academic objectivity.74  Legal interpretation is the central 
work of legal scholarship in both the civil and the common law 
systems.75  Indeed, one of the major goals of legal scholarship is to 
offer a systematic and coherent interpretation of judicial decisions.  
Although legal interpretation may not secure completely clear or 
comprehensive categorization of the law, it should not intentionally 
bring about confusion.  Such would constitute irresponsible legal 
scholarship.  Unfortunately, placing Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case in dichotomous categories accentuates the lack of 
cohesion. 
The bifurcation and irrelevance perspectives of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case each embrace both governmental power—inherent 
power in foreign affairs—and human rights—the constitutional 
status of aliens.  However, neither perspective of Yick Wo maintains 
this view.  Yick Wo, under both the irrelevance and bifurcation 
perspectives, is interpreted solely from the view of the protection of 
constitutional rights. 
The constitutional rights issue in Yick Wo is evaluated differently 
by the two versions.  In the irrelevance version, the Court’s 
intervention to protect the plaintiffs’ economic liberty paved the way 
for the Lochner era and set the stage for the coming of industrial 
expansion.76  The plaintiffs’ Chinese identity was not central to the 
Court’s decision.  Rather, the Court’s primary concern was finding a 
way to advance a laissez-faire economic ideology.77  In other words, 
the Court decided Yick Wo based on the positive influence it would 
have on economic prosperity and not due to concern for human 
rights or racial equality.  In contrast, the bifurcation point of view 
identifies Yick Wo’s crucial issue as the Court’s progressive stance 
 
74 See KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 71, at 34 (explaining various 
methods of framing legal inquiries so that one may “suspend . . . ordinary beliefs and 
normative commitments” to pursue a neutral study of the law). 
75 For the role of legal interpretation in the Civil Law System found primarily in Europe, 
see generally FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE: WITH PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE TO GERMANY (Tony Weir trans., 1995).  With respect to the interpretive 
characteristic of law in the Common Law system, see generally RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S 
EMPIRE 90–96 (1986). 
76 See Bernstein, The Chinese Laundry Cases, supra note 11, at 212 (arguing that the logic 
used to decide Yick Wo—recognizing the “right to earn a livelihood free from . . . government 
interference”—presaged the liberty of contract doctrine forged in Lochner); Joo, supra note 11, 
at 356 (arguing that Yick Wo bridged the gap between a race-based rights approach to equal 
protection after the Slaughter-House Cases and an economic rights approach in Lochner). 
77 See PRIMUS, supra note 33, at 153 (emphasizing the Court’s interest in the free labor 
issue rather than racial equality). 
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on equal protection.78  In this sense, the plaintiffs’ Chinese identity 
was a key factor in the Court’s analysis.  Identifying the true 
meaning of Yick Wo is therefore complicated by the existence of 
these two contrasting views. 
As discussed in the preceding section, the irrelevance reading of 
Yick Wo is built on a disregard for the text in the Court’s opinion.  
The Court’s recognition of the significance of the plaintiffs’ alien 
identity within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
overlooked.  Further, the Court’s commentary on the expansive 
protection granted by the Equal Protection Clause is neglected.  
This sort of distortion and inconsistency between the irrelevance 
and bifurcation readings creates doubt about the responsibility of 
either. 
To support these allegations of irresponsibility in the current 
scholarship regarding Yick Wo, the importance of the Court’s 
exploration of equal protection needs to be further addressed.  The 
Court’s solid stance on equal protection in Yick Wo is evident by the 
Court’s specific attention to the matter.79  In addition, the 
institutional structure of the American judicial system supports the 
protection of equal rights.  The Court is obligated to respond to the 
claims proposed by the opposing parties.  Also, the opinions of 
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, are structured by 
inferior courts’ disputed decisions.80  Thus, even if the Court’s 
opinion is ambiguous, it can often be clarified by reading the claims 
of the two parties and the inferior courts’ opinion together.  In Yick 
Wo, the plaintiffs’ appeals concerned the equal protection issue.81  
The equal protection issue was also relevant in In re Wo Lee, one of 
the two cases appealed to the Supreme Court under the title of Yick 
 
78 See generally Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens, supra note 11, at 866. 
79 Justice Matthews, in contradicting the Supreme Court of California’s reading of Barbier 
v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885), reasoned that a municipality may use its police power to 
regulate certain actions if similarly situated persons are treated alike; but disparate 
treatment under the guise of police power violates the Equal Protection clause.  Yick Wo, 118 
U.S. at 367–68. 
80 See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 37–
49 (1981) (discussing the institutional relationship between trial courts and appellate courts). 
81 The plaintiff in Yick Wo alleged that, 
[M]ore than one hundred and fifty of . . . [the plaintiff’s] countrymen [were] arrested 
upon the charge of carrying on business without having such special consent, while those 
who [were] not subjects of China, and who [were] conducting eighty odd laundries under 
similar conditions, [were] left unmolested and free to enjoy the enhanced trade and 
profits arising from this hurtful and unfair discrimination.  The business of [the] 
petitioner, and of those of his countrymen similarly situated, [was] greatly impaired, and 
in many cases practically ruined by this system of oppression to one kind of men and 
favoritism to all others. 
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359. 
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Wo v. Hopkins.82  From these two points we can infer that in Yick 
Wo, the Court was concerned with equal protection of the laws and 
its normative implications. 
The preceding proof supports the notion that the irrelevance 
account of Yick Wo is an instance of irresponsible scholarship.  This 
may lead to a confirmation of the bifurcation scenario—Yick Wo as 
the liberal pioneer—despite the skepticism advanced by the current 
literature on point.  The following section will challenge the 
humanitarian reading of Yick Wo under the bifurcation perspective. 
By putting the dichotomy approach in the broader contemporaneous 
context, its insufficiency in relation to Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case will become apparent. 
2.  The Insufficiency of the Dichotomy Myth 
If the irrelevance reading of Yick Wo is academically 
irresponsible, one could envision that the response from scholars 
would be to dismiss the irrelevance account of Yick Wo and the 
Chinese Exclusion Case in favor of the bifurcation reading.  Indeed, 
from the perspective of immigration rights, the irrelevance reading 
of the Chinese Exclusion Case, categorized as a landmark in the 
area of foreign affairs, can still find a link to the bifurcation 
reading.83  However, a problem arises with regard to the validity of 
the bifurcation reading of the Chinese Exclusion Case in the equal 
protection context. 
According to the bifurcation reading of Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, the former glimmered as the forerunner of equal 
protection, while the latter was condemned for its inherent racism 
against Chinese laborers.84  Both the academic literature on the 
1880s and the facts documented in the Chinese Exclusion Case 
showed that widespread racism against Chinese laborers prevailed 
in the public opinion and therefore prompted Congress’s enactment 
of the Chinese Exclusion Acts.85  Racism clearly played a major role 
 
82 In In re Wo Lee, the evidence showed that all Chinese applications for laundering 
permits were denied, while all Caucasian applications were granted.  26 F. 471, 473–74 
(C.C.D. Cal. 1886). 
83 Foreign affairs powers can be linked to the issue of immigrant rights since Congress’s 
broad power to regulate immigration is seen as relating to foreign intercourse, “i.e., to foreign 
relations.”  See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 11, at 70–71. 
84 See supra notes 46–66 and accompanying text. 
85 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 595–96 (1889) (addressing the prevalent 
animosity and resentment towards the Chinese, resulting in the modification of America’s 
treaty with China in 1880).  See generally ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: 
LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 258–65 (1971) (exploring the 
KUO FOR PUBLISHER.DOC 11/24/03  5:29 PM 
2003] The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building 45 
in the Chinese Exclusion Case.86  Moreover, judging from the frame 
of reference set by the Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case, a sense 
of Sinophobia permeated the case and doubtlessly influenced the 
decision.  However, if this is true, how can one account for the 
Court’s benevolent position in Yick Wo, also decided in a climate of 
national Sinophobia?  Perhaps the racism seen in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case is only a function of interpretive hindsight.  The 
wording of Justice Field’s opinion, however, makes this highly 
improbable.87  In essence, even though there was an atmosphere of 
Sinophobia during the 1880s that influenced the Court’s decisions, 
it is presumably still possible to acknowledge the benevolence of 
Yick Wo due to some factor that distinguishes it from the Chinese 
Exclusion Case. The question then becomes, what is that factor? 
If the Court’s opinions provide no explicit answer, it becomes 
necessary to look to external circumstances.  There are two possible 
relevant circumstances: the first is timing; the second is changes in 
the Court’s composition.  The response from the temporal point of 
view might be that there was a shift of public attitude toward 
Chinese immigrants in the time between the cases.  This answer is 
not entirely satisfactory considering the short interval of three 
years between Yick Wo (1886) and the Chinese Exclusion Case 
(1889).  Even if a shift could be imaginable, the facts immediately 
contradict this supposition.  According to the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, both the Treaty of 1880 and the subsequent Chinese 
Exclusion Acts of the 1880s were the products of contemporaneous 
widespread Sinophobia.88  In addition, the Chinese Exclusion Case 
clearly reflected the public’s escalating Sinophobia.89  Thus, it is 
 
general fears of competition with the Chinese labor force and the development of various anti-
Chinese movements through the late 19th century). 
86 See HANEY LÓPEZ, supra note 3, at 37–38 (arguing that “purposeful racial 
discrimination” is still constitutional because the Chinese Exclusion Case has never been 
overturned); NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 119 (comparing the racist assumptions of The Insular 
Cases (1901) to the racist logic used in the Chinese Exclusion Case); Chew, supra note 58, at 
13–14 (acknowledging the Chinese Exclusion Act as the first significant immigration policy to 
use race as the basis for regulating entry and noting the anti-Asian sentiments expressed by 
some jurists at that time). 
87 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 595–96 (criticizing the Chinese for their 
unwillingness to assimilate into American culture, as well as urging that their failure to do so 
posed a threat to the sanctity of the American culture). 
88 130 U.S. at 595 (describing the growing hostility present at the California constitutional 
convention which declared Chinese immigration an “Oriental invasion” and a “menace to our 
civilization”); see also Cleveland, supra note 9, at 113 (reiterating rampant anti-Chinese 
sentiments that were exacerbated by widespread unemployment following drought and 
economic depression in the 1870s). 
89 See, e.g., LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 9–10 (1995) (indicating that the Chinese were 
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inconceivable that this Sinophobia—lasting over 30 years—would 
have ebbed in 1886 and soared again in 1889.90 
Second, from either the position of legal realism or critical legal 
studies, the makeup of the Justices of the Supreme Court 
unquestionably accounts for important swings in judicial 
doctrines.91  However, for Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case, 
this theory cannot stand firm in light of statistics.  A comparison of 
the Justices who heard Yick Wo, with those participating in the 
Chinese Exclusion Case reveals that six of the eight Justices were 
holdovers from the Yick Wo Court, including the author of the 
Chinese Exclusion Case opinion, Justice Field.92  The ratio of 
overlapping personnel was seventy-five percent in these two cases, 
which, it should be noted, were both unanimous decisions.  
Personnel changes, therefore, do not account for the outcomes in 
Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case. 
Since it seems clear that the divergent outcomes of Yick Wo and 
the Chinese Exclusion Case cannot be reconciled through external 
factors, such as time and personnel, the following section will 
 
blamed for the unstable economy, subjected to racial attack and generally feared as a 
culture). 
90 In 1884, the Court in Chew Heong v. United States did seem to take a more benevolent 
approach to Chinese immigrants.  However according to Justice Field, the difference between 
the Chinese Exclusion Case and Chew Heong rested on the Chinese Exclusion Act of Oct. 1, 
1888. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 599.  In other words, Chew Heong was based 
only on statutory interpretation, not on an inclination for benevolent treatment of Chinese 
immigrants.  See Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).  In this sense, Chew 
Heong cannot be taken as a counter-example to corroborate the proposition that there was 
less Sinophobia around the middle of 1880s.  In contrast, the statutory ex post facto punitive 
regulation of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888 was taken for granted.  Considering the 
constitutional hierarchy of the prohibition of ex post facto punishment, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 3, the Court’s disregard of this issue in the Chinese Exclusion Case can only be explained 
under the veil of statutory interpretation.  See infra text accompanying notes 191–217. 
91  The doctrinal change from Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625–26 (1869)—
holding that paying any debt with United States notes or legal tender is unconstitutional if 
the debt existed before the passage of the law allowing legal tender—to the Legal Tender 
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553–54 (1870)—which overruled Hepburn v. Griswold to allow 
legal tender when applied to debts made before passage of the legal tender laws—may only be 
attributed to the appointment of Justices Strong and Bradley to the Court by President 
Grant.  See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 157–58 (1993). 
92 The Justices who participated in Yick Wo were Samuel F. Miller, Stephen J. Field, 
Joseph P. Bradley, Morrison R. Waite, John Marshall Harlan, William Burnham Woods, 
Stanley Matthews, Samuel Blatchford, and Horace Gray. The Justices who decided the 
Chinese Exclusion Case included Samuel F. Miller, Stephen J. Field, Joseph P. Bradley, John 
Marshall Harlan, Samuel Blatchford, Horace Gray, Melville W. Fuller, and Lucius Q.C. 
Lamar.  See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 176–77 (1994).  Justice Matthews died on March 22, 1889, but Justice David 
J. Brewer did not succeed to his seat until the 1890 session; thus only eight Justices 
participated in the Chinese Exclusion Case.  See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: 
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789–1993, at 230, 253 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993). 
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instead look to internal factors.  Particularly, the focus will be on 
clues found within the texts of the Court’s opinions which could 
illuminate a reason for the divergence. 
3.  Janus or Dichotomy? 
Since the dichotomous narratives of Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case cannot be fully explained by external circumstances, 
the next approach is to revisit the text itself in search of answers.  
As the preceding section revealed, there is continuity between the 
two accounts of the Chinese Exclusion Case.  The problem is with 
the discontinuity between the two versions of Yick Wo. 
The Court in Yick Wo made its decision based on equal protection 
and economic liberty, both of which are protected under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.93  The challenge, then, is to find a 
connection between these two bases and the axis of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case.  Yick Wo will be addressed here, leaving the 
Chinese Exclusion Case to the next part. 
The Yick Wo Court was primarily concerned with the property 
rights dimension of economic liberty, since the plaintiffs’ 
substantive interest was in their freedom of occupation and the use 
of their property.94  However, the Court’s concern has been 
incorrectly characterized by the irrelevance reading.  It has been 
characterized as a harbinger of economic liberty in the context of 
industrial expansion rather than viewed as part of a longstanding 
emphasis on property rights.95  This tenuous interpretation suggests 
that Yick Wo was the predecessor of the Lochner era, thus 
discrediting its equal protection influence.96  While it is reasonable 
to situate the case within the historical development of industrial 
capitalism, such an emphasis on subsequent events creates a flawed 
one-dimensional model. 
Protection of property was not a new concept in the 1880s, but 
rather was a key issue from the inception of the Constitution.97  
 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 24–26. 
94 “The ordinance drawn in question in the present case is of a very different character. It 
does not prescribe a rule and conditions for the regulation of the use of property for laundry 
purposes, to which all similarly situated may conform.”  Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368 (emphasis 
added). 
95 See Bernstein, The Chinese Laundry Cases, supra note 11, at 257–58 (indicating that not 
only did the municipal ordinance at issue in Yick Wo unconstitutionally infringe on 
individuals’ property rights it also interfered with an individual’s right to participate in a 
lawful occupation). 
96 See Joo, supra note 11, at 385. 
97 See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 47–48 (2d ed. 1994) 
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Thus, interpreting Yick Wo as a case of pure economic liberty 
protected by substantive due process misses the historical 
developments that preceded it.  Simply because Yick Wo occurred in 
the early days of the Gilded Age cannot justify its disassociation 
from previous constitutional developments.98  Although the Gilded 
Age signaled a turn in historical developments, there was not a 
rupture between it and the preceding Reconstruction Age.99  Thus, 
the Equal Protection Clause cannot be fully disregarded through 
the argument that, “[b]y 1886, when Yick Wo was decided, 
Reconstruction was officially dead . . . .  The substantive 
commitment to the rights of blacks [i.e., equal protection] had faded, 
but the commitment to rights of labor and contract persisted for 
another two generations.”100 
Irrespective of the potential problems resulting from the equal 
protection issue, Yick Wo should be placed in the course of its 
historical development.  Yick Wo’s treatment of property protection 
played a role in bridging the 1880s to the previous era, and 
reinvigorated the old subject of property protection in the emerging 
era of industrial capitalism.  Moreover, in contrast to the 
longstanding interest in the protection of property, equal protection 
was still a constitutional novelty in the 1880s.  The very fact that 
equal protection and the protection of property turned up side-by-
side in Yick Wo highlights the necessity of a historical overview in 
understanding the 1880s. 
Thus, the ostensible distinction between equal protection and 
protection of property in Yick Wo seems more like the two faces of 
Janus than two halves of a dichotomy.101  Taking this as a point of 
departure, the following section turns to constitutional change as a 
basis for analyzing the dividing interface of Yick Wo and seeks to 
determine whether or not this scenario can also be used to explain 
 
(explaining that at the founding it was very important that there be language in the 
Constitution which would protect the rights of property owners). 
98 The Gilded Age refers to the years around the 1880s, during which the drive to 
industrialization climaxed in the United States.  There is, however, disagreement as to the 
beginning and ending years of the Gilded Age.  See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 2, at 347 
(suggesting that the Gilded age lasted from 1876 to 1898); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 97, at 67 
(indicating that it began in 1865 and ended in 1900). 
99 The Compromise of 1877, which led to the presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes, has been 
generally deemed as the end of Reconstruction.  After 1877, however, there was what has 
been referred to as a “remnant” stage of Reconstruction that lasted until the 1890s.  See 
SMITH, supra note 2, at 290. 
100 PRIMUS, supra note 33, at 153 n.61. 
101 Janus is the ancient Roman god of doorways and beginnings, often represented by two 
faces looking in opposite directions.  See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 715 (College Ed. 1969). 
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the Chinese Exclusion Case. 
III.  YICK WO, THE CHINESE EXCLUSION CASE, AND NATION-
BUILDING 
The analysis of these two cases, up to this point, has revealed that 
a major problem with the dichotomy scenario lies in its one-
dimensional historical outlook.102  To address this, it is necessary to 
further analyze historical development in order to create a more 
comprehensive account of Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case. 
While the 1880s may have foreshadowed the emergence of 
industrial capitalism, perspectives on that period should not be so 
limited.  It is more appropriate to view the 1880s both as a link and 
a watershed in American constitutional development.  More 
specifically, the 1880s may be viewed as a link in the process of 
American state-building from the time of the Revolutionary War,103 
and as a watershed that filtered out the agitation associated with 
Reconstruction after the Civil War.104  Further, within the 
framework of American state-building, the 1880s were not only 
symbolic of the progress of industrialization in the United States, 
but also foreshadowed the coming of American expansionism and 
the Modern Republic.  Thus, to make sense of the different 
outcomes of Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case, the temporal 
and bi-dimensional features of the 1880s in the course of American 
state-building must be embraced. 
One further note about the concept of American state-building is 
needed.  Despite the difference between the concepts of state-
building and nation-building,105 these two can be used 
 
102 See supra text accompanying notes 22–36 (contending that Yick Wo cannot be 
adequately explained by reference to the protection of economic liberty in the context of 
industrial expansion). 
103 Professor Stephen Skowronek identifies the period between 1877 and 1920 as a 
departure from both the institutional development which preceded it and that which followed.  
See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 15 (1982).  Specifically, Skowronek divides this 
period into two stages: the stage of state-building as patchwork, from 1877 to 1900, and the 
stage of state-building as reconstitution, from 1900 to 1920.  See id. at 16. 
104 The meaning of the new constitutional regime codified in the Reconstruction 
amendments, especially the Fourteenth Amendment, had not yet been determined by 
constitutional dialogue.  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 81–104 
(1993) [hereinafter, ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (outlining the history, before and after the 
Civil War, covering both the political and judicial perspectives of the Reconstruction 
Amendments). 
105 See JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND 
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 20 
(1996) (discussing state-building as an artificial and orchestrated process creating 
KUO FOR PUBLISHER.DOC 11/24/03  5:29 PM 
50 Albany Law Review [Vol. 67 
interchangeably in this context.106  In comparison with the 
rationalistic genre of state-building, however, nation-building has 
more emotional flavor beyond simply consolidating particular state 
institutions.107  Accordingly, the term “nation-building” is used in 
place of Professor Skowronek’s “state-building” to refer to the 
pivotal pattern of American constitutional developments from 1776 
onward.  While it might not have been visible in institutional 
entities, it permeated the public mentality.108 
To further a comprehensive reading of Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, I will begin with an overview of American 
constitutional development, beginning in the year 1776, to provide a 
general framework.  Next, I will revisit the 1880s with regard to 
American nation-building.  Ultimately, my purpose is to place Yick 
Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case in a broad historical context to 
facilitate an understanding of the core meaning running through 
them. 
A.  Sovereignty as the Focus of Constitutional Development 
American nation-building is a term used to describe an ongoing 
process.109  Arguably, it is not clear when the United States 
achieved sovereignty on the international stage.110  Putting the 
 
transferable loyalties, in contrast with nation-building as a somewhat more organic creation 
of identity with and loyalty to a community).  See also GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE STATE: ITS 
NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 27 (1990) (explaining that, especially during the 
nationalist phase, nation-building usually preceded state-building in the historical cycle, and 
that the existence of the nation became a legitimizing factor for the violent and difficult 
processes in developing a state). 
106 Cf.  LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 105, at 34 (using the United States as an example of a 
state-nation; i.e., a multicultural state that in spite of its lack of homogeneity is able to 
inspire in its citizens a sense of identity and loyalty). 
107 See id. at 22 (arguing that nation-building creates certain feelings of loyalty amongst 
citizens that state-building cannot match); POGGI, supra note 105, at 27 (proposing that 
nation-building embodies a sense of nationalism that will lead to the furtherance of state-
building).  Cf. Cleveland, supra note 9, at 261–62 (noting that American nation-building in 
the late 1800s reflected a reconciliation of the nations so that it could be reestablished as a 
state). 
108 Professor Skowronek also points out that the early American state was “essential to 
social order and social development in nineteenth-century America.”  SKOWRONEK, supra note 
103, at 19.  See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN 
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 61 (2001) (arguing that in the founding era “the term 
‘nation’ ha[d] little to do with organic nationhood”). 
109 Woodrow Wilson said: “From the first America has been a nation in the making . . . self-
originated, self-constituted, self-confident, self-sustaining . . . .” WOODROW WILSON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 182 (7th ed. 1997) (1907) [hereinafter 
WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT]. 
110 The Continental Congress began acting in 1774, but independence was not officially 
recognized by England until the Peace of 1783.  Further, it was not until 1789 that the 
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issue of the precise founding year aside, clarifying and consolidating 
the ambiguous concept of sovereignty has been a major task for the 
United States.111  Adding to the debate are the changed conceptions 
of sovereignty generated by the Reconstruction Amendments.112  It 
seems the debates over the relationships and configuration of the 
state, national sovereignty and the Constitution comprised the 
“grammatical” foundation of American nation-building.  Yet, to 
understand the basic structure of this nation-building process, it is 
necessary to go further.  Because the grammatical aspect of the 
American nation-building story is so familiar, the ensuing 
subsection is more schematic than analytic.  This subsection will be 
followed by a discussion of the rhetorical aspect of American nation-
building known as economic pragmatism. 
1.  The Grammatical Foundation: State, Sovereignty, and the 
Constitution 
In order to understand the nature of American nation-building, it 
is necessary to begin with the proposal that the United States did 
not officially become a nation until after the States ratified the 
Constitution.113  Although the modern nation-state is regarded as 
the crystallization of the Enlightenment ideal of a “politically” 
created community,114 nearly all states around the world are more 
or less built on non-political underpinnings.115  In this vein, a state 
 
Constitution actually became effective.  Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink, 
Constitutional Crisis: The German and American Experience, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE 
OF CRISIS 1, 336–37 n.22 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000).  From a legal 
perspective, Professor Bruce Ackerman would choose 1783, when the Peace Treaty of Paris 
was concluded, as the date the United States achieved sovereignty.  See E-mail from Bruce 
Ackerman, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School, to Ming-sung 
Kuo, J.S.D. candidate, Yale Law School (Jun. 17, 2002, 09:25 EST) (on file with author). 
111 See e.g., MCCLOSKEY, supra note 97, at 43 (discussing the role of the Supreme Court in 
establishing the “doctrine of national authority”). 
112 See FLETCHER, supra note 108, at 2 (positing that the Reconstruction Amendments 
changed the definition of popular sovereignty from one based on “voluntary association, 
individual freedom, and republican élitism” to one grounded in “organic nationhood, equality 
of all persons, and popular democracy”). 
113 See Jacobson & Schlink, supra note 110, at 336–37, n.22 (proposing various events 
which might have signaled the formation of the United States, including the ratification of 
the Constitution in 1789).  Cf. Michel Rosenfeld, The European Convention and constitution 
making in Philadelphia, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 373, 375 (2003) (arguing that the Constitution of 
the United States preceded the American nation because the American nation was “built over 
time by successive waves of foreign immigration”). 
114 See Mark E. Brandon, Constitutionalism and Constitutional Failure, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE 
298, 298 (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001) (stating that “constitutions [are 
often thought of] as devices for creating and holding together a political world”). 
115 Usually some fixed physical foundation, like a defined territory or an organic 
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created of non-political elements is supposed to precede the creation 
of a constitution.116 
Nevertheless, the founding of the United States challenged this 
principle by implementing the political ideals of the 
Enlightenment.117  In contrast to the European model—where the 
modern state preceded the enactment of a constitution—the 
American state is a direct result of its constitution.118  This 
chronological order accounts for the crucial issues that have been 
entangling the political and constitutional development of the 
United States since the issuance of the Declaration of Independence 
in 1776. 
In order to better understand the American model of nation-
building, it is necessary to examine the relationship between 
sovereignty and the original Constitution.  Unlike the European 
model, the American Constitution is constitutive, rather than 
cognitive of sovereignty.  In a modern sense, the decisions 
concerning where sovereignty is to reside represent the founding of 
a state.119  If the state was the presupposition of constitution-
making, then the portions of the Constitution concerning 
sovereignty would have aimed to recognize the status quo of the 
pre-Constitution era.  Thus, in the case of American state-founding 
and constitution-making, the architects of the Constitution must 
 
configuration, such as culture or ethnicity, constitutes the presupposition of state. See 
MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN AMERICAN 12–13, 53–61 (1996). 
116 Carl Schmitt’s constitutional theory presupposes the precedence of the state to 
constitution-making.  See Jan Müller, Carl Schmitt and the Constitution of Europe, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1777, 1782 (2000) (positing the theory that a political nation could not be 
formed until the people had united to create a state in which the unifying goal was a “political 
existence”). 
117 Cf.  Michel Rosenfeld, Constitution-making, Identity Building, and Peaceful Transition 
to Democracy: Theoretical Reflections Inspired by the Spanish Example, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1891, 1897–98 (1998) (indicating that France is another example of the “political” 
construction of the French nation). 
118 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.  Cf. SHELDON S. WOLIN, THE PRESENCE OF 
THE PAST: ESSAYS ON THE STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1989) (arguing that the American 
state came about simultaneously with the Constitution).  Arguably, what may be considered 
the first American Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, preceded the founding of the 
United States.  ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 77 (7th ed. 1991) (noting that the Articles of Confederation, despite the fact 
that they preceded the founding of the U.S., were more concerned with relations between the 
states and did not create the republican form of government associated with the United 
States).  In addition, the Declaration of Independence asserted that the colonies were “free 
and independent states” and referred to colonists as “‘one people.’”  Id. at 76. 
119 See e.g., PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION supra note 18, at 76 (arguing that while 
a constitution will attempt to place sovereignty with the people, this removes the ability of 
the people to express their unified opinion through revolution).  For the purposes of this 
article, sovereignty refers to the sovereign power monopolized by the state that is authorized 
in the name of the people. 
KUO FOR PUBLISHER.DOC 11/24/03  5:29 PM 
2003] The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building 53 
have planned for sovereignty.  The contemporaneous setting of 
thirteen “sovereign” colonies, however, complicated the 
constitutional allocation of sovereignty between the federal and 
state governments.  Specifically, the approach in the original 
Constitution to the constitutive issue of sovereignty resulted in 
constructive ambiguity.  Thus, it can be said that the original 
Constitution did not resolve all of the controversies related to 
sovereignty.120 
In conjunction with creating an ambiguous jurisdictional 
relationship between the federal and state governments, the 
Constitution also ignores the sovereignty-based concept of national 
citizenship.  As with the issue of sovereignty in general, the failure 
of the Constitution to address national citizenship was due to the 
lack of a definitive sovereign state.121 
Based on the policy of constructive ambiguity in the original 
Constitution, sovereignty issues have created constitutional pitfalls.  
In addition to constitutional amendments,122 sovereignty problems 
were addressed through judicial interpretation of the Constitution.  
According to the late Professor Robert McCloskey, the Marshall 
Court invoked the Contracts Clause,123 the Necessary and Proper 
 
120 Regardless of the fact that the Constitution was ambiguous with respect to sovereignty, 
in the years following its ratification, there was a distinct trend toward controlling the states 
via the federal government.  Despite the lack of specification with respect to the jurisdictional 
relationship between the federal and state governments, it can be inferred that the telos of 
the Constitution leans toward consolidating power in the federal government rather than 
maintaining the status quo of independent member states.  See WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 109, at 178–79 (stating that the old theory of state sovereignty has 
been replaced by the reality that the federal government has the ability to control the states). 
121 National citizenship is the legal mechanism that gives definition to “the people.”  See 
generally Maximilian Koessler, “Subject,” “Citizen,” “National,” and “Permanent Allegiance”, 
56 YALE L.J. 58, 61–62 (1946) (stating that the word “nationality”, although legal in nature, 
indicates that a person or citizen belongs to a particular nation or ethnicity).  Neither the 
Articles of Confederation nor the original Constitution expressly provided for national 
citizenship. For the issue of citizenship in the Articles of Confederation, see KELLY ET AL., 
supra note 118, at 77 n.1. 
122 The Bill of Rights—Amendments I–X—was initially intended to demarcate the 
boundary of federal power so as to preserve the power of the states.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, at xii–xiii, 7 (1998) (illustrating that 
the Bill of Rights was designed to empower the states to protect the people from the possible 
tyranny of the new federal government).  But see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 
424 (1793) (holding that a state may be sued in the Supreme Court by a private citizen of 
another state without effect to that states’ sovereignty; this was superceded by the Eleventh 
Amendment); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 97, at 22 (indicating that the decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia was an attempt by the Court to establish its power to rule on issues of 
constitutionality, thus strengthening the federal government). 
123 E.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136–39 (1810) (indicating that contracts to 
which the state is a party are reviewable by the Supreme Court); Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. 
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (applying the Contracts Clause of the 
Constitution to declare a New Hampshire law that modified the charter of Dartmouth College 
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Clause,124 and the Commerce Clause,125 among other things, to 
maintain the federal rein on the states.  Moreover, the Marshall 
Court augmented “judicial sovereignty” by employing the power to 
grant a “writ of error”, arguendo, a power bestowed on the court by 
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.126 
The fact that the creation of the American Constitution preceded 
the founding of the United States suggests that the centrality of 
sovereignty issues in the early days of the republic was 
presupposed.  The Court, intent on expanding its own power, settled 
the sovereignty disputes between the federal government and the 
states so as to support the emergence of a national consciousness.127  
The Marshall Court set the example of judicial review as judicial 
sovereignty for its successors at home and abroad.128 
2.  Rhetoric: Economic Pragmatism 
Apart from the grammatical configuration between state, 
sovereignty, and the Constitution, the substantive rhetoric of 
American nation-building also emerged in the constitutional 
development of the early republic. 
An examination of the course of nation-building from the Articles 
of Confederation to the Constitution, reveals that practical needs 
played an important role in the founding of the Union.  Besides the 
clear necessity of winning the Revolutionary War, economic 
 
unconstitutional).  See also MCCLOSKEY, supra note 97, at 47–50 (examining the use of the 
Contracts Clause by the Marshall Court as a mechanism for expanding judicial power over 
the states). 
124 E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408–13 (1819) (interpreting 
Article I, §8, cl. 18 to allow Congress to execute powers not expressly granted by the 
Constitution, provided that the end be legitimate and the means not otherwise prohibited).  
See also MCCLOSKEY, supra note 97, at 43 (highlighting the significance of the decision in 
McCulloch with respect to federal authority over the states). 
125 E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (The Steamboat Monopoly 
Case) (rendering a New York State law that prevented federally licensed navigators from 
entering New York waters unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause).  See also 
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 97, at 45–46 (explaining the Marshall Court’s use of the Commerce 
Clause to expand federal control over the states). 
126 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (affirming the power of the 
Supreme Court to review the decisions of the highest state court when a federal question is 
involved).  See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 97, at 39 (stating that the writ of error allowed the 
Supreme Court to review state court decisions made in the name of federal law). 
127  See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 97, at 55–56 (explaining that the Marshall Court’s rule of 
national supremacy over states was continued in the succeeding Taney Court). 
128 For the legacy of judicial sovereignty in the United States, see infra text accompanying 
notes 222–39.  For the legacy of judicial sovereignty abroad, see generally ALEC STONE 
SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 153–93 (2000) 
(discussing the role of the European Court of Justice in transforming the European Union as 
an international organization into a supranational polity). 
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struggles were extremely influential in focusing attention on 
strengthening the federal government.129  A pragmatic mindset with 
respect to national economic prosperity, commerce and finance, 
comprised the rhetoric of American nation-building.130 
Historically, economic pragmatism can be traced back to before 
the Revolution.  The founding of separate colonial Commonwealths 
in North America indicated that the British legacy of capitalism had 
been transplanted.131  Conversely, in the aftermath of the 
Revolutionary War, individual states seemed driven toward both 
anarchy and tyranny, out of which developed various measures 
detrimental to the economy.132  Until Great Britain recognized the 
independence of the United States in 1783, the passion for 
moneymaking had been widespread in American society, although it 
was not universal.133  Thus, discovering how to make the setting 
beneficial to economic growth became a convergent point of public 
opinion. 
In this context, the United States—reconfigured by the 
Constitution—replaced the Confederation.  Subsequently, the 
nationalistic “lawyer-statesman,” Alexander Hamilton, accepted the 
post of the first Secretary of the Treasury in order to deal with the 
chaotic economic environment.  Thus, under Hamilton’s 
manipulation, the spirit of capitalism integrated with the 
nationalist sentiment, creating “economic nationalism.”134 
The connection between the concerns of early Americans about 
economic stability and growth and nation-building was reflected not 
only in federal policy but also in judicial decisions.  Both McCulloch 
v. Maryland,135 which concerned the interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, and Fletcher v. Peck,136 which concerned the 
Contracts Clause, had bearing on the development of the 
infrastructure of a capitalist economy by tilting against state 
 
129 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 82–83 (presenting the many economic failures 
suffered under the Articles of Confederation). 
130 See SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
246–47 (1993) (surmising the feelings of Alexander Hamilton and James Madison concerning 
the need for a strong central government in order to promote economic stability). 
131 See LIAH GREENFELD, THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM: NATIONALISM AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 364 (2001). 
132 These measures included “[t]he confiscation of property, the paper money schemes, the 
tender laws, and the various and devices suspending the ordinary means for the recovery of 
debts.” GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 404 
(1969). 
133 See id. at 388. 
134 See GREENFELD, supra note 131, at 388–98. 
135 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
136 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
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powers.137  Thus, the strain of American nation-building via judicial 
review also reflected the emergence of economic nationalism in the 
Early Republic. 
This rhetoric, as the driving force of American nation-building, 
found its matrix in economic pragmatism.  Economic pragmatism 
then reconfigured as economic nationalism and advanced the course 
of American nation-building. 
B.  Sovereignty Contentions in the 1880s 
During the 1880s, the country was not breaking away from the 
turbulence created by the Civil War and Reconstruction.  To fully 
understand the nation-building of the 1880s, it is necessary to 
examine how the nation reconceptualized the idea of sovereignty 
during the Civil War and Reconstruction.  However, the notion of 
sovereignty that developed during the 1880s cannot be 
oversimplified by characterizing the Gilded Age as simply a 
continuation of the foregoing eras.  This would confuse the 
momentary historical events of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
with their enduring historical significance.  Although the Civil War 
and Reconstruction have had a long-lasting influence on subsequent 
historical development, these events cannot dictate the meaning of 
historical development.  Rather, they should be assessed in 
conjunction with the historical events that followed.  To understand 
the development of sovereignty in the United States, the 1880s 
must be considered for the role they played in American nation-
building as a link between the Civil War and the modern era.138 
The catalyst for the Civil War was the hostility created by the 
allocation of jurisdictional powers between the federal and state 
governments.139  Thus, the major effect of the Civil War was to 
restructure the relationship between the two levels of government, 
resulting in the enhancement of the powers of the federal 
government.140  In addition, a clear concept of nationhood resulted 
 
137 The former bore on the integrity of the banking system, which constituted a major pillar 
of economic operation. The latter was typical of the protection of private property, which was 
deemed as the cornerstone of a capitalist economy. 
138 See Cleveland, supra note 9, at 256–57 (characterizing the Gilded Age as period of rapid 
industrialization as well as a “period of tremendous insecurity for the American people”). 
139 The ultimate provocation of the Civil War was the South’s secession from the Union and 
its subsequent attack on federal forces at Fort Sumter.  Emancipation of the slaves did not 
originally appear as the main concern of President Lincoln.  See KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, 
at 291–295. 
140 See WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 109, at 178 (noting that after 
the Civil War, it was clear that the federal government was “the final judge of its own 
KUO FOR PUBLISHER.DOC 11/24/03  5:29 PM 
2003] The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building 57 
from the Civil War.141  While the term “United States” continues to 
imply a degree of pluralism, the solidarity that is implicit in the 
word “united” was reinforced after the Civil War.  Moreover, the 
tendency toward “nationalization” was not simply expressed in the 
public rhetoric, but was also inscribed in the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment.142  
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments also 
reflected the enhancement of federal power through their restraint 
on state authority.  The Civil War Amendments, in effect, recorded 
the development of a trend toward nationalization, both in the 
structure of the government and in the psyche of the American 
public. 
The judiciary likewise played a crucial role during the 1880s in 
shaping the course of American nation-building.  Although the 
Zeitgeist of nationalization during the Civil War and Reconstruction 
was codified in the Constitution, its concrete meaning was not 
clarified and defined until subsequent cases arose.  Thus, if the 
Civil War and Reconstruction are seen as the impetus for the 
emergence of the principle of nationalization, the “sedimentation” of 
the constitutional meaning of nationalization occurred during the 
1880s.143  In the relative tranquility of the 1880s, the nationalistic 
view of the Civil War materialized.144  Both Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case reflected the Supreme Court’s mission to 
memorialize the constitutional meaning brought about by the Civil 
War and Reconstruction. 
Before presenting an alternative comprehensive reading of Yick 
 
powers”). 
141 See FLETCHER, supra note 108, at 57–59 (arguing that the concept of nationhood, along 
with those of equality and democracy clearly resulted from the Civil War); WOLIN, supra note 
118, at 80 (positing that the Civil War was the impetus for a developed state consciousness); 
see also FLETCHER, supra note 108, at 47 (emphasizing the degree to which Lincoln promoted 
the notion of nationhood in the Gettysburg Address). 
142 See U.S. CONST. amdn. XIV, § 1.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause provided, for 
the first time, that citizens of the several states would have a discrete citizenship of the 
United States.  See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1872); see also Bruce 
Ackerman, Ackerman, J., concurring., in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD 
HAVE SAID 100, 101 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (emphasizing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
made clear that state citizenship was secondary to national citizenship). 
143 See Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1487 (1990) (defining the concept of “sedimentation” as the way in which 
ideas and assumptions become imbedded in our consciousness until they are present without 
our awareness). 
144 See JOHN M. DOBSON, AMERICA’S ASCENT: THE UNITED STATES BECOMES A GREAT 
POWER, 1880–1914, at 5 (1978) (noting the “independence from international political 
alliances, . . . great abundance of resources, and [the] blissful freedom from fear” enjoyed by 
Americans after Reconstruction). 
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Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case, it is important to consider the 
role of the 1880s as a watershed in the course of American nation-
building.  We are better equipped to understand the Court’s task of 
“sedimenting” the idea of nationhood in the 1880s by considering 
the nature of the Gilded Age.  Thus, the remainder of this section 
focuses on the development of sovereignty in the 1880s.  First, the 
effect of the nationalizing trend on the internal dimension of 
sovereignty will be addressed.  Next, the looming image of the 
“American Empire”—also a product of the same nationalizing 
trend—in terms of the external dimension of sovereignty will be 
discussed.  The core implications of the duality of the nationalizing 
tendency for the nation-building movement will then be analyzed.  
Finally, an interim conclusion will be drawn to shed light on the 
unnoticed role of the 1880s in the course of American nation-
building. 
1.  Reinforcing Federal Sovereignty on the Domestic Stage 
In the aftermath of the Civil War and Reconstruction, one of the 
central tasks was to reinforce federal sovereignty.  As a matter of 
historical fact, maintaining the integrity of the Union, instead of 
abolishing slavery, was the original cause of the Civil War.145  
Therefore, after defeating the renegade Confederate states, the 
major constitutional concern was to tighten the federal rein on the 
states.146 
This mission to enhance the role of the federal government by 
compromising state powers was in fact launched in the middle, 
rather than in the wake, of the Civil War.  In an attempt to deal 
with formidable military defiance from the Confederate states, 
President Lincoln exceeded traditional presidential powers by 
claiming war powers deduced from the constitution.147  The notion of 
war powers derived from Lincoln’s desire to preserve the 
 
145 See Cleveland, supra note 9, at 261 (affirming that the Civil War was waged over the 
status of the Union and the supremacy of the national government); see also KELLY ET AL., 
supra note 118, at 292–93 (detailing the actions taken by Lincoln directly following secession 
and noting that his primary aim was to save the nation). 
146 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 323 (explaining one theory of reconstruction, the 
goal of which was to create sufficient control over the states as to guarantee the future 
security of the Union). 
147  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for the president’s role as Commander in 
Chief); see also KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 293 (noting that in evaluating the graveness 
of the situation, Lincoln proceeded to “prepare the nation for war without either aid or new 
authority from Congress”); CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS 
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 224 (1948) (extolling Lincoln for “assum[ing] 
unprecedented authority on his own initiative”). 
KUO FOR PUBLISHER.DOC 11/24/03  5:29 PM 
2003] The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building 59 
Constitution, rather than directly from the text of the 
Constitution.148  It is worthy to note that the Constitution is 
constitutive of the “State” in the United States.149  Thus, the concept 
of preservation of the Constitution can be traced to the idea of 
Staatsräson, or “Reason of State.”150  The emergence of Staatsräson 
during the Civil War served to dissolve feudal politics in America.151  
In other words, the drive to retain the Union brought to the 
forefront the constitutional recognition of the broad implications of 
war powers, raised public consciousness, and created a 
constitutional setting for the modern state. 
This nationalizing trend, achieved by tightening the federal rein 
on the states, did not steadily progress, but rather recoiled 
intermittently.  The Reconstruction era, from 1865 to 1876, marked 
the pinnacle of nationalization, especially during the period of 
“Radical Congressional Reconstruction” from 1867 through 1876.152  
The federal military occupation of the former Confederacy 
highlighted the intensity of federal control over the southern 
states.153  However, the period of federal dominance was not 
unending, nor were its effects as comprehensive as had been 
expected.154  Once the federal troops withdrew from the South—as a 
result of the Compromise of 1877—many southern states 
intransigently resumed and skillfully built up their apartheid 
regimes.155  The Gilded Age, which trailed the Reconstruction era, 
witnessed an ebb in the nationalizing trend resulting, not only from 
 
148  See  KARL LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 225 
(1957) (defining Lincoln’s war powers as “extra-constitutional”); ROSSITER, supra note 147, at 
224 (illustrating that Lincoln—despite the fact that he may not have had constitutional 
support for his actions—was prepared to save the union and the government by expanding 
the traditional notion of the war powers); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to 
Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1110–11 (2003) (discussing the 
possibility that Lincoln believed emergency war powers to be available to the executive in 
times of peril regardless of their legality or their ratification by Congress). 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 110–15. 
150 See WOLIN, supra note 118, at 163 (defining “Reason of State” as a justification, 
typically in time of war, for extraordinary state action). 
151 Id. at 80–81 (arguing that, since the Civil War, the state has defined the terms of 
American political and social life, eclipsing vestiges of feudalism). 
152 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 289–90 (summarizing the stages of the Reconstruction era, 
culminating with Congress taking control from President Johnson and creating an era of 
“Radical Congressional Reconstruction”).  Radical Congressional Reconstruction was the 
period of Reconstruction largely committed to extending civil rights to blacks. 
153 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 337–40 (detailing the Military Reconstruction Acts 
of 1867). 
154 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 290 (pointing out that the initial radical reforms ended up 
being far less radical than originally promised). 
155 Id. (admitting that, although it was not an abrupt process, by the 1890s, most 
Republicans had abandoned hopes of creating civil rights for southern blacks). 
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the long-lasting struggle between southern diehards and northern 
radicals, but also from the corruption of federal politics.156  
Nevertheless, the Union’s defeat of the Confederacy set the tone for 
nationalization. 
The slowdown of the nationalization trend after Reconstruction, 
combined with public skepticism toward national politics, did not 
prove fatal to the federal government’s control of the states, though 
it did force the federal government to change its strategy concerning 
the maintenance of this control.  In lieu of the forceful approaches of 
the Reconstruction era, the tactics used by the federal government 
in the 1880s were reminiscent of antebellum judicial sovereignty.157  
The federal claim of judicial sovereignty did not result in the 
unconditional surrender of states to the federal government.  The 
Civil Rights Cases of 1883 are illustrative of this territorial battle 
waged in the Supreme Court.158  Although federal judicial 
sovereignty was not wholly dominant, a persistent course of federal 
superiority became readily detectable, forging a new path toward 
nationalization. 
In addition to the drive toward nationalization in the aftermath of 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, social developments in the 1880s 
also highlighted the realistic needs of nationalization by enhancing 
the role of the federal government at the cost of the individual 
states.  After the trauma of the Civil War and Reconstruction, the 
push for judicial sovereignty in the 1880s was in part brought about 
by a desire to cure heightened social conflict, resulting from 
increased immigration, urbanization and industrialization.159  The 
federal government was forced to gradually cultivate a civil service 
system to deal with such problems.160  These developments exposed 
both the weakness of America’s still pre-modern state as well as the 
 
156 See KELLY ET AL. supra note 118, at 365–70 (discussing the post-Reconstruction trend of 
Americans to gravitate, not toward government involvement, but away from it—allowing 
political bosses and machines to take control and resulting in a public distrust of politics). 
157 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 103, at 41–42 (characterizing the federal judiciary’s 
jurisprudence in the 1880s as “aggressive” as it increased its control over the other 
governmental branches). 
158 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  “In the Civil Rights Cases the Court . . . sustained traditional 
boundaries of federalism by limiting national power under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
remedying state sanctioned deprivations of rights.”  Michael Les Benedict, Comment on 
Guyora Binder, “The Slavery of Emancipation”, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2103, 2103 n.2 (1996). 
159 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS 
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 10 (1992). 
160 See SKOWRONEK, supra note 103, at 49 (noting that increased federal power put such a 
strain on the delivery of governmental services that the development of a new civil service 
system was imperative). 
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necessity of establishing a centralized regulatory regime.161  
Regulatory agencies were created to tackle the complexity of these 
problems;162 while law, as an autonomous system, became a guide in 
the “‘search for order.’”163  The national government managed these 
contemporaneous social changes in part through regulation of 
commerce and through the federal judicial annulment of state police 
power over the private economy. 
Both urbanization and industrialization in the 1880s had much 
bearing on the soaring economic development and nationalization.164  
Further development of the new economy required individual states 
to concede to centralized regulation in order to create a systematic 
legal order which would stabilize complex transactional behaviors 
in the market.165  The economic component of this new wave of 
nationalization brought to the forefront the role of the federal 
judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, because it allowed for the 
establishment of a systematic legal order.166  Undeniably, in the face 
of the notorious connection between business tycoons and the party-
state system, the Court, at the apex of a relatively autonomous legal 
system, did not always perform in concert with federal regulatory 
politics.  The Court often vacillated between two extremes—either 
supporting the private interests sought by a coalition of politicians 
and business patrons or maintaining the value-neutral judgments 
that were perceived as necessary to the flourishing capitalist 
economy.167  However, the Court’s winding path was nonetheless 
representative of the judiciary’s assertion of federal regulatory 
policies rather than a federal concession to state claims.168  With 
Reconstruction nearing its end, this trend moved in tandem with 
increasing judicial sovereignty, which acted as an alternative means 
of achieving nationalization. 
Surely, the 1880s pose a formidable obstacle to students seeking 
 
161 See id. (juxtaposing America’s new industrial expansion against social conditions 
resembling the “Old World” as evidence of the need for civil reform). 
162 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 72 (rev. ed. 1998) 
(using the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission as an example of the 
administrative agencies adopted to regulate business). 
163 HORWITZ, supra note 159, at 10. 
164 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 162, at 71–72 (noting that after the Civil War, the age of 
technology and industry started to accelerate and rule the economy). 
165 See id. at 72–73. 
166 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 386 (arguing that the emergence of the Supreme 
Court in this era occurred in order to fill governmental voids left by the other branches). 
167  See id. at 397 (showing that the Court did so by regulating and protecting the national 
economy without consistently favoring corporations). 
168 See infra text accompanying notes 222–39 (discussing Yick Wo as an example of the 
Court’s tendency to assert federal sovereignty). 
KUO FOR PUBLISHER.DOC 11/24/03  5:29 PM 
62 Albany Law Review [Vol. 67 
to provide a comprehensive account of American nation-building.  
Nevertheless, some trends can be perceived.  In sum, while the 
robust move toward nationalism that grew from the Civil War and 
Reconstruction receded in the 1880s, another strand of 
nationalism—economic nationalism—soon took its place.169  The 
economic aspect of this new wave of nationalization moved away 
from the military battlefield after the fading of Reconstruction and 
shifted toward the federal judiciary.  Thus, the nation-building in 
the 1880s was adopted from changes initiated in the antebellum 
period.  But the new political economy and social situation 
complicated this process of nationalization. 
2.  Emerging American Sovereignty on the International Stage 
Although the Spanish-American War of 1898 is generally seen as 
a watershed in the course of American foreign policy, marking the 
United States’ ascendance as a great power in the world, the traits 
of American expansionist policy have their roots in the immediate 
postbellum years.170  In the late 19th century, the groundwork for 
the subsequent American ascent on the international stage was 
laid, revealing expansionist tendencies.171 
In the years after the Civil War, the United States was engrossed 
in its internal affairs, particularly in Reconstruction.  Having 
experienced unprecedented violence in the Civil War, the country 
adopted a policy of demobilization, rather than displaying its muscle 
to the world.172  However, throughout the end of the 19th century 
the policy of territorial expansion had been continuing on the 
continent.  The United States’ moral motivation to civilize abroad 
and desire to acquire a secure stretch of land arose before the Civil 
 
169 See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL STATE 
AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859–1877, at 16–17 (1990). 
170 See ROBERT H. FERRELL, Introduction to AMERICA AS A WORLD POWER, 1872–1945 xv 
(Robert H. Ferrell ed., 1971) (arguing that the Americans began to shift their national 
thinking toward becoming an imperialist world power as early as the mid-1880s); see  MILTON 
PLESUR, AMERICA’S OUTWARD THRUST: APPROACHES TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1865–1890, at 9–
10 (1971) (concluding that American “[a]ppetite for new territory” began to manifest itself 
during the Gilded Age). 
171 See ERNEST R. MAY, IMPERIAL DEMOCRACY: THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICA AS A GREAT 
POWER 6–8 (2d ed., 1991) (attributing America’s ascent onto the international stage, in part, 
to tremendous domestic economic growth). 
172 See DOBSON, supra note 144, at 25–26 (explaining that the “disbandment and dispersal” 
of the military after the Civil War was an indication that domestic affairs would take priority 
over foreign policy); MAY, supra note 171, at 7 (noting that the demobilization of the U.S. 
military made concern about the international arena “irrelevant” for the time being). 
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War.173  Either by the sword or by the purse, the United States had 
expanded its land from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific from the 
time of Independence to the Civil War.174  In the years following the 
Civil War, the United States stretched its hands out, acquiring 
Alaska and the Midway Islands in 1867.175  However, the public 
mood following the end of the Civil War and at the beginning of 
Reconstruction did not favor expansionism.  Rather, the country, in 
the 1880s, placed most of its attention on industrialization and 
economic development.176  This internal preoccupation with economic 
affairs, in a way, constituted a new wave of outward expansion. 
From the nation’s inception, economic prosperity and the zeal to 
advance commercial and trade acts constituted one of the major 
driving forces of nation-building.177  Before the 1880s, a spirit of 
economic nationalism gradually took shape in the course of 
American nation-building.  In addition to Reconstruction efforts, the 
end of the Civil War saw the nation’s leaders resuming the task of 
developing industry.178  Seeking to constantly expand markets, the 
push to develop the U.S. economy was not long confined to the 
domestic stage alone.  With the glut of national production starting 
in the 1870s, the domestic market gradually reached its limits, 
urging U.S. companies to seek foreign markets.179  Various 
commercial interests abroad encouraged the United States 
government to get involved in the business of promotion, including 
the promotion of oil, copper and steel interests.180  This outward 
economic thrust brought about a new and more vigorous surge of 
economic nationalism in the Gilded Age. 
 
173 See Cleveland, supra note 9, at 164–65; see also SMITH, supra note 2, at 205 (arguing 
that Manifest Destiny in the 1840s was seen as “God’s design for the Anglo-American race” so 
that Americans could rule over the west and displace “degenerate, despotic, [and] Jesuitical 
Spanish influences”). 
174 See DOBSON, supra note 144, at 13 (arguing that “[t]erritorial aggrandizement must be 
considered a dominant tradition in American history”); see also Cleveland, supra note 9, at 
164–65. 
175 Cleveland, supra note 9, at 164–65. 
176 See PLESUR, supra note 170, at 5–6 (illustrating that the prevailing view among 
America’s leaders in the postbellum era was not in favor of expansionism). 
177 See KELLY, ET AL., supra note 118, at 363 (indicating that, at the end of Reconstruction, 
economic development was a main issue in the growth of Constitutional politics). 
178 See id. (noting that Congressional policies toward industrialization, including revisions 
to banking and tariffs and the introduction of internal improvement legislation, resumed 
upon the conclusion of the Civil War). 
179 See Matthew Frye Jacobson, BARBARIAN VIRTUES: THE UNITED STATES ENCOUNTERS 
FOREIGN PEOPLES AT HOME AND ABROAD, 1876–1917, at 18–19 (2000) (contending that while 
modern theorists debate the truthfulness of America’s overproduction, mere talk of such 
overproduction led to a perceived need to secure foreign markets). 
180 MAY, supra note 171, at 9. 
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Ultimately, the United States made substantial gains in the 
pursuit of becoming a world power and needed to take forceful 
action to continue on this path.  In order to open up international 
markets in Asia and the Pacific Islands and to simultaneously 
protect new business interests abroad, the United States had to 
build itself into a great sea power.181  Beginning in the 1870s, with 
the support of the U.S. Navy, the United States steadily built up a 
presence in the Samoan Islands and Hawaii.  Moreover, 
“[b]eginning in the early 1880s Congress authorized . . . the 
construction of big-gun steel warships.”182  The United States thus 
began its ascent toward achieving status as a great world power. 
In addition to these new economic interests propelling the United 
States onto the international stage, the surge of national pride—a 
result, in part, of military build up—was also a factor in the nation’s 
new focus on international matters.  Based largely on the combined 
concepts of religion, morality, and chauvinism, the United States 
refocused its attention outward.  Employing a puritan legacy of 
“Manifest Destiny” and absorbing contemporary social Darwinism, 
the United States claimed that it was chosen by God to implement 
His will.183  With God on its side, the leaders of the United States 
presumed that the nation had an entitlement in the world arena.  
The U.S. leaders also felt that America’s democratic traditions and 
the abolition of slavery made the United States morally superior to 
the old European monarchies following the Civil War.184  This 
moralistic presumption contributed to America’s bold global 
involvement in international affairs starting in the 1880s.185 
After the global spread of American religious and economic 
interests, combined with the symbolic presence of the United States 
Navy around the world, a sense of chauvinistic national prestige 
emerged.  This prompted the reformation of consular services and 
the modernization of the Department of State, which are the most 
conspicuous symbols of the modern state.186  Consequently, the 
 
181 See, e.g., CAPTAIN A.T. MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660–
1783, at 22 (1890) (discussing the influence that sea power has upon a nation’s strength and 
wealth). 
182 MAY, supra note 171, at 7. 
183 See DOBSON, supra note 144, at 17–19 (presenting a detailed account of the underlying 
themes associated with America’s employment of Manifest Destiny). 
184 See id. at 18–19 (discussing the “missionary attitude” embraced by Americans who were 
eager to “civilize” the rest of the world). 
185 See id.; see also Cleveland, supra note 9, at 262–63 (positing that the American 
annexation of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines was inspired by America’s particular 
sense of moral superiority over the inhabitants of their newly acquired land). 
186 See  PLESUR, supra note 170, at 37–44, 47–50 (discussing the calamities of the early 
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establishment of those very symbols of modern state authority 
solidified the new sense of national prestige and further inspired 
the United States’ expansion onto the international stage. 
Undeniably, wars demarcated new eras throughout the course of 
American history.  Both the end of the Civil War in 1865 and the 
Spanish-American War in 1898 marked major shifts in the course of 
American nation-building.  The end of the Civil War signaled the 
peak of American nation-building and its cementing of a clear 
national consciousness.187  The Spanish-American War not only 
marked the climax of American imperialism but also foretold the 
coming of a new age, in which the United States would dominate as 
a world power.188  Nevertheless, the period between 1865 and 1898 
was a transition period in which the United States evolved from a 
nascent nation-state to a great international power.  The 
combination of economic needs, military buildup, religious zeal, and 
national prestige drove the United States, as a strong sovereign 
nation, onto the international stage.189  In sum, “[h]aving put both 
the Civil War and Reconstruction behind it, the nation confidently 
sought recognition as one of the great Western powers and was 
willing to join in the scramble to colonize weaker peoples to achieve 
that goal.”190 
3.  Implications of an Aggressive, Two-Pronged Nation-Building 
Effort 
The preceding analyses of the two dimensions of American 
nation-building in the 1880s clearly show an attempt by the United 
States to polish its image as a modern sovereign nation.  This 
attempt is reflected in both the enhancement of federal governing 
powers at home and in the assertion of American national interests 
abroad.  Before focusing on the two strains of Chinese immigration 
 
post-Civil War State Department and consular service, and the subsequent reformation of 
both). 
187 See FLETCHER, supra note 108, at 2–4 (noting Lincoln’s reference in the Gettysburg 
Address to a “nation under God” and inferring from that a shift from “peoplehood to 
nationhood”). 
188 See MAY, supra note 171, at 269–70 (likening the United States’ domination of the 
world to a greatness “thrust upon” a nation that was paradoxically isolationist in its actions). 
But cf. DOBSON, supra note 144, at 87–88 (noting that the Spanish-American War was not a 
startling departure from America’s foreign policy goals in the 1880s and may have been a 
mere continuation of an already begun pattern of international relations). 
189 See DOBSON, supra note 144, at 10 (arguing that the arrogance of American rhetoric 
regarding foreign affairs had more effect on its success on the international stage than any 
actual imperial power). 
190 NEUMAN, supra note 11, at 84. 
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cases, it is necessary to address the issue of immigration in the 
United States in the 1880s. 
Understanding immigration is necessary to understanding the 
self-image of a political community.191  Immigration is “[t]he act of 
entering a country with the intention of settling there 
permanently.”192  Immigrants, whether they acquire formal 
citizenship or not, generally change the status quo of their host 
political community.193  Existing social, economic, cultural, and even 
political situations change as a consequence of immigration.  In the 
face of this kind of challenge, tension builds between the host 
political community and the immigrants.194 
Two primary responses from the host political community often 
occur.  First, there may be an effort to maintain the purity of the 
existing political community through separation and exclusion, 
whether it is de jure or de facto.195  This particular response 
generally results from a sense of difference or “us versus them” 
consciousness.  The other response is to assimilate immigrants 
based upon a sense of the host political community’s superiority.196  
This response also originates in a sense of difference; however, 
unlike separation and exclusion, with assimilation the host 
members generally believe in the transformability of the 
immigrants’ identity and the ultimate possibility of achieving 
sameness.197  These two possible responses to immigration provide 
the lens through which the self-image of the political community 
and its policy toward other issues may be viewed.  Pushed to the 
logical limits, exclusion and assimilation can be extended to 
symbolize the two strands of traditional policies toward the 
solidification of the political community. 
The Gilded Age foreshadowed the transition of the United States 
 
191 See Bosniak, supra note 11, at 963 (identifying the concepts of “border regulation” and 
“internal community membership” as inherent in the concept of a community). 
192 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 752 (7th ed. 1999). 
193 See Bosniak, supra note 11, at 964 (detailing the differing accommodations made for 
immigrants and balancing of rights and opportunities that the host community must provide 
to new immigrants). 
194 See Mary Fulbrook & David Cesarani, Conclusion, in CITIZENSHIP, NATIONALITY AND 
MIGRATION IN EUROPE 209, 214–17 (David Cesarani & Mary Fulbrook eds., 1996) (illustrating 
the problems faced by immigrants when they attempt to live in a new community). 
195 See Bernhard Giesen, National Identity and Citizenship: The Cases of Germany and 
France, in EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL LEGACIES AND POSTNATIONAL 
PROJECTS 36, 37–41 (Klaus Eder & Bernhard Giesen eds., 2001) (explaining the challenges 
faced by those seeking citizenship in a new community). 
196 See id. at 43–45 (describing the universalist approach to outsiders, which is to force 
them to acquire learning and education in a manner prescribed by the universalism). 
197 See id. at 37–38. 
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from a regional, pre-modern federation to a modern federal nation-
state and global power.  Along with the emergence of a national self-
consciousness, an image of the American political community 
developed on the basis of ascriptivism.198  Regardless, what merits 
special note is that ascriptivism also reconfigured the demarcation 
between the internal and the external.  As a result, the two faces of 
aggressive nation-building in the Gilded Age seemed to converge on 
policy areas concerning the demarcation of the political community.  
Moreover, immigration stands as a paradigm for the effect of 
ascriptivism on the interface of domestic and foreign affairs.199  
However, before addressing the implications of the political 
community image in Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case, an 
investigation of an analogous area corroborates the influence of the 
ascriptivist Zeitgeist of the 1880s on the boundary between the 
internal and external—Native Americans. 
The federal government’s treatment of Native Americans in the 
antebellum period epitomized its policy of excluding a particular 
group from the body politic in an attempt to strengthen the image of 
the American political community.200  According to the Constitution 
of 1787, Native Americans were not included as part of “[W]e the 
People of the United States,” although the soil they inhabited was 
geographically within the boundaries of the United States.201  The 
exclusion of Native Americans from American politics was the first 
implication that those residing within the country could be “foreign 
to the United States in a domestic sense.”202  This constitutional 
 
198 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 386–87 (illustrating how the reforming vision of the 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union, under Francis Willard, was an example of the appeal 
of ascriptive ideologies). 
199 In the Gilded Age, the United States adopted a series of restrictive measures, including 
the Chinese Exclusion Acts and subsequent expulsion policy. See SMITH, supra note 2, at 357–
71. 
200 See CATHERINE A. HOLLAND, THE BODY POLITIC: FOUNDINGS, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
DIFFERENCE IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION 29–30 (2001) (discussing Jefferson’s 
role in early American federal policies of exclusion toward Native Americans). 
201 According to Article I, Section 2, clause 3, untaxed Indians were not included in 
deciding the number of representatives of each state. Representatives signify an expression of 
the sovereignty inherent in “We the People.” Thus, that Native Americans played such a 
small role in the determination of representation implies that Native Americans were not 
constitutionally included in the body of “We the People.” 
202 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341–42 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (coining the 
term “[f]oreign in a domestic sense” to refer to the special status of unincorporated territories 
within the United States).  According to Justice White, unincorporated territories, like Puerto 
Rico, are under the umbrella of American sovereignty.  However, due to their ethnic and 
cultural particularity these territories were “unincorporated” and therefore their inhabitants 
could not be entitled to constitutional rights and could not equally assume constitutional 
obligations. Id.  In this article, the term is used to describe the special treatment of Native 
Americans in the antebellum era. 
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trick was further employed both by the judicial and the political 
branch.  The Native Americans were initially treated as heathen 
and alien people by the English settlers, and seen as deserving only 
“war, conquest, and treaty negotiations.”203  As a result, in a legal 
sense Native American tribes were regarded as foreign nations even 
after the enactment of the Constitution.204 
By regarding Indian tribes as foreign nations, however, Native 
Americans recognized neither their parity with, nor independence 
from, the United States.  Rather than keeping their status as 
foreign nations, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court coined the 
term “domestic dependent nations” to define the status of Native 
Americans within the United States.205  To the Court, the 
relationship between Native Americans and the federal government 
was like that of “ward[s] to [their] guardian.”206  Native Americans 
were considered to be “under the sovereignty and dominion of the 
United States.”207  The Court spoke of the Native Americans in such 
a way as suggest the potential threat they posed to the territorial 
integrity of the United States.”208 
Despite the prior refusal to grant Native Americans citizenship, 
after the end of the Civil War, federal policies and attitudes towards 
Native Americans gradually shifted to become more 
assimilationist.209  With the close of the Civil War in 1865, Congress 
sought to prevent another war as it aggressively pushed through its 
sweeping Reconstruction policy in the South.210  In 1867 Congress 
created the Indian Peace Commission to recommend how to end the 
Plains Indian War.211  In reaction to the proposal from Congress, the 
federal government adopted the assimilationist attitude by ceasing 
to negotiate with Indian tribes as sovereigns thereby assimilating 
them into the dominant society.212  In 1871, Congress passed an 
 
203 KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 381. 
204 Cleveland, supra note 9, at 26–27 (noting that, although the United States did not grant 
Native Americans the same respect due to European countries, their status as a threat to 
domestic security pushed them outside the scope of the American polity). 
205 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 See id. (stating that “any attempt to acquire the[] lands [of the Native Americans], or to 
form a political connection with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our 
territory and an act of hostility”) 
209 See SHARON O’BRIEN, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS 71–72 (1989) (detailing 
the first postbellum steps taken by the U.S. government to assimilate Native Americans). 
210 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 335. 
211 O’BRIEN, supra note 209 at 71. 
212 Id.  But see. Cleveland, supra note 9, at 50 n.298 (noting that “[t]he [e]xecutive branch 
continued to pursue federal-Indian relations through executive agreements until 1919, when 
KUO FOR PUBLISHER.DOC 11/24/03  5:29 PM 
2003] The Duality of Federalist Nation-Building 69 
appropriations law preventing the federal government from making 
further treaties with Indian tribes.  The Appropriations Act of 1871 
was “the first legal groundwork necessary to begin assimilationist 
lawmaking.”213 
The assimilationist attitude toward Native Americans in the 
Gilded Age paralleled the trend of nationalization in general.  After 
eliminating the status of the Indian tribes as sovereign entities in 
treaty-making practices, the federal government pushed forward to 
claim its sovereignty over the tribal lands.  In 1885, Congress 
enacted the Major Crimes Act to extend federal criminal jurisdiction 
with respect to major crimes over Indians living on reservations.214  
The assimilationist policy toward Native Americans in the 
movement of consolidating the American political community 
culminated in the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act)215 
The Dawes Act did, however, retain some traces of exclusionism.  
The Act granted citizenship only to those Native Americans who 
received allotments and those who had separated from their tribe 
and adopted the habits of “civilized life.”216  The far-reaching intent 
of this policy was to break up the traditional relationship between 
the Native American tribes and for Native Americans to adjust to 
American customs and ideals.217  Unassimilated Native Americans 
were regarded as external to American society and, therefore, were 
to be excluded from the American political community. 
Overall the U.S. policies towards Native Americans in the 1880s 
reflected the ideology of American ascriptivism and the desire to 
“convert” Native Americans in an effort to firmly set out the modern 
construction of a sovereign nation.218  Under the dominance of 
American ascriptivism, constructing and maintaining a uniform and 
powerful American community by virtue of exclusion and 
 
Congress prohibited the practice”). 
213 O’BRIEN, supra note 209, at 71. 
214 18 U.S.C. §1153 (2000).  The statute covered several serious crimes, including murder, 
manslaughter, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary and larceny. 
215  25 U.S.C. 331–34, 339, 341–42, 348–49, 354, 381 (2000); see Cleveland, supra note 9, at 
54–56 (noting that the Dawes Act allowed the government to allot tribal lands without 
consent, expanded allotment policies beyond the Five Civilized Tribes and extended state and 
federal jurisdiction over Native Americans).  Such policies continued to gain momentum.  In 
1890, for example, “Oklahoma Territory was organized in that part of the Indian land where 
white settlement was heaviest.” See KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 382. 
216 SMITH, supra note 2, at 392–93. 
217 See Cleveland, supra note 9, at 55 (noting a statement in the 1889 Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs that “tribal relations should be broken up . . . and the family 
and the autonomy of the individual substituted); see also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE 
INDIANS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO THE PRESENT 24 (1985). 
218 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 390–93. 
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assimilation became one of the central tasks of the 1880s.  The 
relationship and choice between exclusion and assimilation relied 
on an elusive ideal of what was and was not to be included in the 
concept of the American nation.219  This elusiveness is reflected in 
the federal policies toward Native Americans in the 1880s, 
especially in the Dawes Act.  The impact of this on immigration will 
be further addressed in the subsequent analysis of Yick Wo and the 
Chinese Exclusion Case. 
4.  Recovering the Gilded Age in American Nation-Building 
The height of the Gilded Age appears to be an interlude between 
two constitutional moments: The Civil War and the New Deal.  As a 
result, its status in the course of constitutional development has not 
been properly recognized.220  Nevertheless, the literature of political 
science and political sociology concerning the emergence of the 
modern American state focuses heavily on the Gilded Age.  The 
following analysis attempts to bridge these two periods. 
To say that the Gilded Age was critical to American nation-
building does not mean that the entire structure of the modern 
American state took shape during this period.  While the Gilded Age 
carried on and refined the nationalization trend launched in the 
wake of the Civil War, this post-Civil War constitutional regime did 
not redefine the relationship between state and society.  The given 
constitutional norms regulating the relationship between the people 
and the government, like freedom of contract, did not open 
themselves up to alteration during the 1880s.  Instead, the great 
transformation of the role of the federal government from that of a 
night watchman to that of an interventionist occurred as a result of 
the New Deal.221 
Overall, the Gilded Age, particularly the 1880s, played a critical 
 
219 For a discussion of the relationship between territoriality and the sense of belonging, 
see ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM IN A GLOBAL ERA 56 (1995) (exploring the 
factors that contribute to a nation’s sense of what is “theirs”); see also POGGI, supra note 105, 
at 26. 
220 See generally William J. Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in 
LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) (concentrating on the 
transformation of the American system of governance between the end of Reconstruction and 
the beginning of the New Deal, and the implications of such transformation on social and 
economic functions). 
221 See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 104, at 140–41 (contrasting the Founders’ 
concern over maintaining limited government with the New Deal’s notion of an 
interventionist government); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 255–61 
(1998) (illuminating the impact of New Deal intervention and its transformative effect on not 
only the national government but also upon the Supreme Court). 
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role in both constitutional development and in the course of 
American nation-building.  However, it would be far-fetched to say 
that the modern image of the American state—the welfare state—
took root in the Gilded Age.  Elucidating both the significance and 
limitations of the Gilded Age, in terms of American nation-building, 
provides a clearer lens through which to re-examine Yick Wo and 
the Chinese Exclusion Case. 
C.  A Comprehensive Account, Delivered by Sovereignty 
The development of American nation-building provides context for 
both Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case.  While the two cases 
are often treated separately, a common approach to both is possible.  
In contrast to the conventional dichotomous treatment of the two 
cases, both should be viewed within the larger context of the 1880s. 
This new and more comprehensive perspective on Yick Wo and 
the Chinese Exclusion Case is built upon text and structure.  It 
combs the text of the two cases looking for the respective discursive 
patterns in both, arguing that the discovery of these patterns 
bespeaks the tone of American nation-building in the Gilded Age.  
Such an analysis responds to specific points that the conventional 
dichotomous accounts of these two cases have left untouched.  
Based on a broad scheme of nation-building, an outline is drawn for 
the structural connection between the two cases. 
After providing a new reading of Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, this section concludes with a suggestion of a new 
approach implied in the comprehensive reading of these two cases.  
This approach moves beyond the traditional confines of the cases 
and addresses the relationship between the protection of human 
rights and the notion of sovereignty.  This suggests a new 
dimension of constitutional law that has historically received little 
attention. 
1.  Yick Wo Symbolizing the Federal Judicial Sovereignty 
As shown in Part I, the Equal Protection Clause was the clear 
textual basis on which the Court struck down the municipal 
regulation at issue in Yick Wo.  The more important issue, however, 
is whether the concept of sovereignty was overlooked in Yick Wo. 
The Court supported the proposition that the concept of nation-
building played a key role in Yick Wo.  Upon addressing the issue of 
whether the Equal Protection Clause applied to non-citizens, the 
Court turned to addressing “the nature and the theory of our 
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institutions of government.”222  The Court addressed the issue of 
sovereignty when it stated: 
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the 
author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign 
powers are delegated to the agencies of government, 
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for 
whom all government exists and acts.  And the law is the 
definition and limitation of power.223 
A distinction between sovereignty and power may be drawn from 
this quotation.224 Sovereignty is above the law and resides with “the 
people” while power is controlled by “the law.” 
After setting a normative hierarchy between power and 
sovereignty, the Court implicitly touched upon the relationship 
between the Constitution and sovereignty.  The Court 
acknowledged that “the authority of final decision” must always be 
“lodged somewhere, and in some person or body.”225  Nevertheless, 
according to the Court, the same authority of final decision must 
also submit to “the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness” because such rights are “secured by [the] 
maxims of constitutional law.”226  In line with the Court’s logic, it 
may be deduced that the Constitution was considered the key to 
sovereignty, trumping all opposing powers. 
Related to the arguments on sovereignty is the Court’s posture on 
the role of the Constitution.  Here again the Equal Protection 
Clause is relevant.  The Court reveals the particular normative 
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause by looking into how it took 
root in the Constitution.  In the Court’s view, the maxims of the 
Constitution that secure fundamental rights are “the monuments 
showing the victorious progress of the race in securing to men the 
blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal laws.”227  
This statement reflects a progressive vision of the Constitution.  
The Constitution, in effect, records the struggle of “the race,” that is, 
the People of the United States.  What is more important is that the 
 
222 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
223 Id. at 370 (emphasis added). 
224 See Cleveland, supra note 9, at 121 (illustrating that while Justice Matthews references 
sovereignty and sovereign powers, he fails to address the differences between the two 
concepts); see also WOODROW WILSON, THE STATE: ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL 
POLITICS 635 (1889) (maintaining that while statesmen have long held the concept of 
sovereignty to be divisible, abstract legal analysis holds the opposite view and considers 
sovereignty to be indivisible). 
225 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. (emphasis added). 
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culmination of the progressive course of the American people 
resulted in “just and equal laws.”  In sum, the Court gave a 
suggestive account of the relationship between the Equal Protection 
Clause and the progressive development of the American People, 
albeit with textual parsimony.228 
The reasons that the Court articulated the normative meaning 
and historical origin of the Equal Protection Clause cannot be 
explained away by a simple invocation of the doctrinal distinction 
between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum.229  On the contrary, an 
overview of the Court’s decisions reveals that the Court always 
speaks in some discursive pattern, thus explaining why the Court 
has historically played a central role in the construct of the 
American community.230  By taking into account the historical 
setting of the 1880s, the connection between the Court’s decision 
and the course of American nation-building becomes clear.  
Distanced from the Civil War and Reconstruction, the 1880s 
allowed for a fleshing out of the meanings of those constitutional 
norms brought about by the constitutional moment of the 1860s.  
The Court assumed a mission of elaboration.  The core of such a 
mission sought to link the Equal Protection Clause to the evolution 
of the nation. 
The proposition that Yick Wo is reflective of post-Civil War 
nation-building gains additional support from two aspects distinct 
from the wording of the Court’s opinion.  While it may be argued 
that it is straining too far to put the problem of federalism and 
sovereignty on the table, it seems clear that the Court itself 
intentionally focused on those very issues.  Moreover, simply 
because federalism centers on the relationship between the federal 
and state governments does not mean that local governments 
cannot be brought into the framework of sovereignty.  On the 
contrary, the place that local governments hold within the 
 
228 See Ackerman, supra note 126, at 103–04 (stressing that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in turn incorporated the principle of equal protection). 
229 See generally Geoffrey Marshall, What is Binding in a Precedent, in INTERPRETING 
PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 503, 505–06 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers 
eds., 1997) (defining ratio decidendi as that which is legally relevant and obiter dictum as all 
else that is stated in a court’s opinion). 
230 See Paul W. Kahn, Independence and Responsibility in the Judicial Role, in TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 73, 81–86 (Irwin P. Stotzky 
ed., 1993) (describing a public narrative of law extending down from judicial decision allowing 
the public to collectively identify itself therein); Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: 
Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1643 (1989) 
(maintaining that the term of law is reversible, thus transcending any one individual’s life 
and serving instead to connect law to a larger sense of nature). 
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governmental system as a whole indicates the tendency to 
consolidate the concept of sovereignty by transferring powers from 
local governments to the federal government.231 
It is also possible to discern the principle of the Court’s 
decisions—as it pertains to the struggle over sovereignty between 
the federal and state governments—by looking further at decisions 
of other federal courts.  Considering the nature of the issues in Yick 
Wo, the rulings of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals become 
particularly illuminating.  The late 1880s saw the Ninth Circuit 
upholding numerous Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state 
and local laws specifically intended to discourage Chinese 
immigration.232  This tendency of the Ninth Circuit is further 
highlighted by contrasting the proclivities of state courts within the 
same region.  Facing similar issues, the California state courts more 
often than not upheld restrictive state and local regulations of 
Chinese immigrants.233  Thus, the federal courts, including the Yick 
Wo court, diverged significantly from state courts with respect to 
the issue of Chinese immigration in the 1880s.234 
Even so, in the year preceding Yick Wo, the Supreme Court ruled 
against the Chinese petitioner in another Chinese laundry case, 
Soon Hing v. Crowley.235  External changes in the country between 
1885 and 1886 account for this divergence; such changes also speak 
directly to the role of federal judicial sovereignty in the post-Civil 
War period.  In late 1885 and early 1886, brutal anti-Chinese riots 
broke out throughout the West.236  In the wake of the militancy of 
 
231 See Kim Economides, Law and Geography: New Frontiers, in LEGAL FRONTIERS 180, 
188 (Philip A. Thomas ed., 1996) (explaining the theory stated in G.L. Clark, Law, the state 
and the spatial integration of the United States, 13 ENVIRONMENT AND PLANNING A 1197, 
1198 (1981), that the U.S. Supreme Court has reduced local autonomy in an attempt to 
promote “spatial homogeneity” and “integration”). 
232 These cases include In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882); In re Ah Chong, 2 F. 
733 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880); In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880); Ho Ah Kow v. 
Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546); and In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213 
(C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102).  See Joo, supra note 11, at 353–54. 
233 See, e.g., Ex parte Wong Wing, 138 P. 695 (Cal. 1914); Ex parte Quong Wo, 118 P. 714 
(Cal. 1911); In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327 (Cal. 1886); In re Yick Wo, 9 P. 139 (Cal. 1885); Sam 
Kee v. Wilde, 183 P. 164 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919); Ex parte San Chung 105 P. 609 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1909). 
234 See Bernstein, The Chinese Laundry Cases, supra note 11, at 271–72 (noting that 
federal courts tended to view these cases as litigation over economic rights); Joo, supra note 
11, at 369–70 (confirming that, unlike California’s Supreme Court, the “relatively new federal 
courts” of the West Coast often upheld attacks on anti-Chinese laws based on the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
235 113 U.S. 703 (1885).  See also Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30 (1885) (holding that 
the ordinance in question was purely a police regulation which lay within the purview of the 
municipality). 
236 See Bernstein, The Chinese Laundry Cases, supra note 11, at 274 (postulating that the 
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Reconstruction and the Civil War, sporadic riots were reminiscent 
of the tumultuous moments of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
era.  These riots signaled a clear challenge to federal authority 
inasmuch as they defied federal policies.237  Thus, in contrast to the 
California state courts, the benevolent attitude of the federal courts 
toward Chinese immigration cases under the Fourteenth 
Amendment suggests that federal judges sought to preserve the 
power that the national government successfully gained during the 
Civil War.238  In sum, the tendency of the Court to rule in favor of 
consolidating federal sovereignty in post-Civil War nation-building 
had much bearing on Yick Wo. 
This new nation-building thesis stands in direct contrast to other 
readings of Yick Wo.  First, a nation-building thesis is 
complementary rather than contradictory; the key is the mentality 
of economic nationalism in the Gilded Age.  The irrelevance reading 
of Yick Wo stresses its connection to subsequent economic 
industrialization.  Nevertheless, as argued in the preceding section, 
economic nationalism set the tone for American nation-building 
since its independence.  Thus, post-Civil War federal protection of 
economic freedom not only contributed to building the uniform legal 
infrastructure necessary for developing its capitalist economy, but 
also continued the course of its nation-building.239  In this sense, a 
nation-building thesis broadens the temporal horizon of Yick Wo as 
set out by the irrelevance readings.  Accordingly, Yick Wo is linked 
to the Chinese Exclusion Case inasmuch as the latter was built on 
the language of national sovereignty. 
The bifurcation reading of Yick Wo—as a liberal pioneer in the 
area of immigration—will be addressed in the final subsection.  The 
following subsection will discuss the more explicit and general 
framework of immigration law set out by the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, and will place it within an analytical framework. 
 
Yick Wo Court may have used its decision in the case to resist a perceived threat to federal 
sovereignty). 
237 See id. (noting that the rioters sought to drive out aliens who were under federal 
protection). 
238 See id. at 272 (explaining that the “[f]ederal judges felt obligated to assert federal 
authority over immigration and to establish the federal government’s authority to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment”). 
239 See PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 23 (1998) (maintaining 
that during the Gilded Age, the “larger legal system . . . was committed to a very broad 
definition of individual and governmental sovereignty”).  Private property is the crucial legal 
mechanism of the infrastructure necessary for a capitalist economic system.  Accordingly, the 
concept of protecting private property, i.e. individual sovereignty, corresponded to the 
dramatic economic expansion during the Gilded Age. 
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2.  The Chinese Exclusion Case and the Sovereign Nation-State 
The relationship between the Chinese Exclusion Case and 
sovereignty has been well-demonstrated by the irrelevance reading 
of this case.240  The Court’s reasoning in the Chinese Exclusion Case, 
which allowed for the trumping of an existing treaty by a 
subsequent statute is considered the foundation of the plenary 
power doctrine in foreign affairs.241  The conception of national 
sovereignty suggests an attitude of self-affirmation in the 1880s. 
The Court validated the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888 by 
resorting to the concept of national sovereignty.242  It is one thing to 
appeal to the power that is explicitly granted by constitutional 
clauses, while it is quite another to ignore constitutional principles 
outright.  Granting that the plaintiff in the Chinese Exclusion Case 
was not entitled to equal protection because of his non-citizen 
status, there remained the issue that the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1888 arguendo contravened the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I of 
the U.S. Constitution.243  The plaintiff, leaving for his homeland 
China in 1887, carried the requisite valid certificate and obeyed the 
other procedural requirements that were provided by law to govern 
the reentry of Chinese laborers.  Despite compliance, the customs 
collector at the San Francisco Port refused him reentry because of 
the new Exclusion Act of 1888, which went into effect one week 
before the plaintiff arrived back in the territorial waters of the 
United States.244  This is paradigmatic of the ex post facto laws 
 
240 See supra text accompanying notes 37–46 (demonstrating that the Chinese Exclusion 
Case has significance regarding the constitutional area of governmental power and foreign 
affairs). 
241 The plenary power doctrine provides the backbone for our constitutional tradition 
affecting foreign affairs.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
242 The Court’s construction of sovereignty was a political concept with no bearing on 
morality.  After assigning the external sovereign power to the political department, the Court 
added that “[t]his court is not a censor of the morals of other departments of the government; 
it is not invested with any authority to pass judgment upon the motives of their conduct.”  
The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 602–03 (1889). 
243 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl.3.  See OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN 
STATE, 1888–1910, at 302 (1993) (noting that Justice Field felt troubled by the retroactive 
aspect of the 1888 statute).  Despite the applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause in this case, 
the plaintiff raised the issue of procedural due process caused by the retroactive aspect of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888; however the plea did not draw the Court’s attention.  See 
Cleveland, supra note 9 at 125 n.874. 
244 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582.  The concept of territorial waters was 
not legally unimaginable in the 1880s.  In fact, the ancient precursor of the concept of 
territorial waters traced back to the thirteenth century.  See SEKHAR GHOSH, LAW OF THE 
TERRITORIAL SEA: EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT 15 (1988).  Nevertheless, the modern 
concept of territorial waters coexisted with the idea that the freedom of the sea was the 
product of the law of nations of the seventeenth century.  See MILNER S. BALL, THE LAW OF 
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prohibited by the Constitution.245  The fact that the Court paid no 
heed to this possible constitutional controversy indicates that its 
construction of national sovereignty took precedence over the 
explicit rules of the Constitution.246  This concept of national 
sovereignty goes to the very heart of sovereignty’s construction.247 
To gain a full sense of the Court’s concept of national sovereignty, 
we need to examine the outline the Court set out in addressing the 
Chinese Exclusion Case.  First, the Court’s temporal point of 
reference corresponded to that of American nation-building in 
the1880s.  As shown in Part II, the timeframe the Court set up for 
the Chinese Exclusion Case traced back to the mid-1840s when the 
United States undertook imperialist ventures in China.248  This 
casts light on the Court’s image of sovereignty.249  The Mexican-
American War of 1848 finalized the map of the United States and 
resulted in the Manifest Destiny doctrine.250  Judging from the 
Court’s conscious sketching of the timeframe and its language of 
national sovereignty, it is plausible that the Court implicitly 
connected the 1880s to the 1840s when it decided the Chinese 
Exclusion Case.  In other words, the Court’s association of the 
Chinese Exclusion Case with the expansionist 1840s era revealed 
not only its awareness of the relationship between the United 
States and China, but also its sense of how the United States 
thought of itself in its approach to foreign affairs.251 
 
THE SEA, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS AND THE EXTENSION OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA 4 (1978).  
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, in 1793, claimed a three-mile territorial sea in notes 
delivered to British and French Ministers.  See id. at 5–6.  It is thus beyond any doubt that 
the plaintiff in the Chinese Exclusion Case entered the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, even though he was offshore. 
245 The Court’s doctrinal stance on Art. I, § 9, cl.3 is that its scope is limited to criminal 
punishment.  See TRIBE, supra note 12, § 8-1, at 1336–37. 
246 See Cleveland, supra note 9, at 130–32. 
247 This extra-constitutional exposition of the concept of sovereignty, which would trump 
the normative values in the Constitution, foreshadows Carl Schmitt’s construction of the 
emergency power of the Weimar Constitution, Article 48.  See John P. McCormick, The 
Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers, in LAW AS 
POLITICS: CARL SCHMITT’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 217, 230–41 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 
1998). 
248 See supra text accompanying notes 70–73 (demonstrating that until 1888, the United 
States had great interest and compassion towards China). 
249 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 205–06 (illustrating America’s intention and success in 
expanding its sovereignty in the 1840s). 
250 See SMITH, supra note 2, at 205–06 (illustrating America’s intention and success in 
expanding its sovereignty). 
251 See PLESUR, CREATING AN AMERICAN EMPIRE, 1865–1914, at 1–2 (Milton Plesur ed., 
1971) (noting that the elites in the Gilded Age advocated for a strong presence of the United 
States on the international stage despite a contrary opinion among the general public).  It 
merits pointing out that the author of the case, Justice Stephen Field, was an example of a 
Jacksonian with roots in Jacksonian Democracy whose legacy with respect to foreign affairs 
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The sovereignty and nation-building implications of the Chinese 
Exclusion Case were not restricted to the area of foreign affairs—
i.e., the external dimension as indicated by the irrelevance account.  
The Chinese Exclusion Case also sheds light on the internal 
dimension of American nation-building.  First, the Court’s concept 
of national sovereignty is reminiscent of federalist dualism.  The 
Court distinguished the internal and external dimensions of the 
United States as a sovereign nation by arguing that “[w]hile under 
our Constitution and form of government the great mass of local 
matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their 
relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one 
nation . . . .”252  The Court then proceeded to illustrate the sovereign 
powers needed to substantiate the nation’s “absolute independence 
and security throughout its entire territory.”253  Among those 
prerogatives illustrated are “[t]he powers to . . . suppress 
insurrection [and] secure republican governments to the 
States . . . .”254  The Court’s definition of sovereignty—by reflecting 
the course of American nation-building from the antebellum era to 
the 1880s—consisted of taking into account the antebellum 
republican arguments for the abolition of slavery, the post-Civil 
War justification for military Reconstruction, and the incorporation 
of the guarantee of the republican form of state government. 
After discussing the substance of the internal dimension of 
sovereignty, the Court turned to the sovereignty issues arising 
under federalism.  The Court cited Justice Marshall’s articulation of 
a federalist concept of the sovereign nation in Cohens v. Virginia.255  
Justice Marshall stated “[t]hat the United States form[s], for many, 
and for most important purposes, a single nation . . . .”256  He further 
stated that, “the government which is alone capable of controlling 
and managing their interests in all these respects, is the 
government of the Union.”257  On the contrary, however, “[t]hese 
 
corresponded with his tone in the Chinese Exclusion Case.  See PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN 
FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 7 (1997). 
252 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889). 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (citing Cohens v. Viginia, 19 U.S. (6 
Wheat.) 264, 413 (1821)) (intending to show support for the idea that the United States is a 
single, independent nation which must provide security throughout its land). 
256 Justice Marshall proceeded to point out that for the purposes of war, making peace, all 
commercial regulations and in many other respects, the American people are “one people.”  
Id. 
257 Id. 
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States are constituent parts of the United States.”258  This reflects 
the duality of the federalist scheme of national sovereignty. 
Although the Court accepted Justice Marshall’s antebellum view 
of the federalist scheme of national sovereignty, the Court’s next 
citation in the Chinese Exclusion Case reflected the transformation 
in the perception of national sovereignty that arose from the process 
of American nation-building.  The Court recognized the importance 
of uniformity in the construction of national sovereignty by invoking 
Justice Bradley’s opinion in the Legal Tender Cases.259  Concurring 
with Justice Strong’s validation of the Legal Tender Acts, Justice 
Bradley asserted that “the United States is not only a government, 
but it is a national government, and the only government in this 
country that has the character of nationality.”260  As a corollary of 
this nature, the federal government has jurisdiction over areas that 
would “require uniformity of regulations and laws.”261  The 
emphasis that the Court placed on the concept of uniformity and the 
nature of the legal tender issue in the late 1860s—which brought 
about the Legal Tender Cases in 1870 that epitomized the transition 
to a modern state—suggests that the domestic trends of post-Civil 
War nation-building also resounded in the Chinese Exclusion 
Case.262 
After setting forth its general construction of national sovereignty 
in a federalist nation, the Court went on to address the particular 
issue involved in the Chinese Exclusion Case.  Initially, the Court 
tied the issue of Chinese immigration to the independence of a 
sovereign nation.  The Court stated that encroachment upon and 
aggression against the sovereignty of a nation may occur in two 
forms.  The first comes from “the foreign nation acting in its 
national character”263  The second conceivable form of foreign 
encroachment and aggression is from “vast hordes of . . . people 
 
258 Id. at 605. 
259 See id. at 605 (citing Knox v. Lee (The Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 555 
(1870)). 
260 Id. 
261 Id. (asserting that certain areas of regulation and law can be efficiently administered 
only by the national government). 
262 Another part of the Court’s citation of Justice Bradley’s opinion in the Legal Tender 
Cases links the Chinese Exclusion Case to the institutional characteristic of the American 
nation-building process.  Following his emphasis on uniformity, Justice Bradley referred to 
the role of the judiciary in maintaining national sovereignty.  See id. (explaining that the 
judiciary’s role in maintaining national sovereignty is governed by its enumerated powers to 
“decide controversies between the States, and between their respective citizens, as well as 
questions of national concern”). 
263 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. 
KUO FOR PUBLISHER.DOC 11/24/03  5:29 PM 
80 Albany Law Review [Vol. 67 
crowding in upon us.”264  In the Court’s view, contemporary Chinese 
immigrants constituted the second kind of threat to the 
independence of the United States.  Chinese immigrants were seen 
to be of “a different race,” which was perceived as difficult to 
assimilate into American culture.265  The Court departed from the 
construction of national sovereignty to the assimilationist vein of 
racism, in which the bifurcation reading of the Chinese Exclusion 
Case has gained ground.266 
What merits special attention is the Court’s implicit association of 
Chinese immigration with the notion of membership in a political 
community.  The Court characterized the government’s power to 
exclude Chinese immigrants, albeit in violation of the existing 
treaty, as part of the right of a sovereign nation to “give security 
against foreign aggression and encroachment.”267  A further 
corollary is that “[e]very society possesses the undoubted right to 
determine who shall compose its members.”268  In the Chinese 
Exclusion Case, the United States’ membership policy was polarized 
on the two extremes of assimilation and exclusion.  Chinese 
immigrants were susceptible to exclusion simply because of their 
resistance to assimilation.  Nevertheless, the polarization of 
assimilation and exclusion in immigration policy alludes to the 
tenuousness of the distinction between the internal and external in 
the concept of sovereignty. 
The flexibility and indispensability of the distinction between the 
internal and the external in the discourse of sovereignty very much 
reflects the nature of national sovereignty.  More than thirty years 
before Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty,269 the Court’s opinion in 




266 See supra text accompanying notes 58–68 (demonstrating that the Court not only 
acknowledged the racism that was directed at the Chinese, but also furthered its ideology by 
upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888). 
267 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.  The Court held that Congress is vested 
with the sovereign power to determine who shall be excluded from the United States, and 
that power cannot be surrendered to a treaty.  Id. 
268 Id. at 607 (citing to Secretary of State Marcy in a letter to Mr. Fay, minister to 
Switzerland, dated March, 1856).  The Court thus concluded that every nation has the 
unlimited power to decide who may become members of its political community.  Id. at 606. 
269 “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”  CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: 
FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) 
(1922) (emphasis added).  The Court went on to state that, “[i]f the government of the country 
of which the foreigners excluded are subjects is dissatisfied . . . it can make a complaint to the 
executive head of our government, or resort to any other measure which, in its judgment, its 
interests or dignity may demand; and there lies its only remedy.”  The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, 130 U.S. at 606. 
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sovereignty with a Hobbesian aphorism. 
To preserve its independence, and give security against 
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of 
every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other 
considerations are to be subordinated. . . .  The government, 
possessing the powers which are to be exercised for 
protection and security, is clothed with authority to 
determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called 
forth.270 
Ultimately, the Chinese Exclusion Case not only reflected the 
international dimension of nation-building in the 1880s but also 
reflected the nature of its domestic dimension.  The intersection of 
the internal and external dimensions of national sovereignty in the 
Chinese Exclusion Case is reflective of the nature of immigration.  
Nevertheless, the complete absence of “rights talk” from this case 
bears on a fundamental issue of constitutional jurisprudence.271  In 
other words, the primary tension between the constitutional 
protection of human rights and national sovereignty is unearthed in 
the legal realm of immigration.  This issue is addressed in the 
following section as a coda to the comprehensive reading of Yick Wo 
and the Chinese Exclusion Case. 
3.  The Ambiguous Relation between Rights and Sovereignty 
If immigration is considerably influenced by concern for national 
sovereignty in constitutional law as discussed in the preceding 
section, does this imply that the bifurcation reading of Yick Wo as a 
liberal pioneer of the constitutional protection of aliens is futile 
because it was an anomaly?  Not necessarily.  To answer this 
question, we must start with the tension pointed out in the 
concluding paragraph of my discussion of the Chinese Exclusion 
Case. 
The Chinese Exclusion Case appears to completely ignore the 
rights of the plaintiff that were violated by the Chinese Exclusion 
Act of 1888.  This could have been the result of omnipresent 
nationalist feelings and racist attitudes particularly directed at 
Chinese immigrants.272  In contrast, the plaintiffs of Yick Wo, who 
were also overwhelmed by the same Sinophobic mentality in the 
 
270 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). 
271 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE (1991) (coining the term “rights talk”). 
272 See supra text accompanying notes 58–63. 
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1880s, found shelter in the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Yick Wo 
Court highlighted the text of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses and stated that their applicability extended to aliens.273  In 
hindsight, this stance seems to be the precursor of universal human 
rights and should be hailed as a victory of the Enlightenment.274  If 
so, what is the explanation for the different balancing between 
sovereignty and rights in Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case? 
The different balances between Yick Wo and the Chinese 
Exclusion Case reveal the equivocal relationship between the 
protection of human rights and national sovereignty, and the 
vulnerability of the universal discourse on rights.  As previously 
discussed in my account of Yick Wo, the Court followed the 
foregoing universal justification of non-citizens, who were also 
entitled to the equal protection and due process provided for in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, with the addition of a genesis of this 
redemption.275  According to this genealogical view, the equal 
protection and due process rights were the blessings of the 
American “race.”276  In other words, the sanctuary that the plaintiffs 
in Yick Wo gained from the Fourteenth Amendment was considered 
under the command of the American people, which constituted the 
foundation of national sovereignty.  Accordingly, the constitutional 
protection given to aliens derived from the will of the American 
people.277  If we focused only on Yick Wo, we could conclude that the 
Court would choose human rights even at the risk of compromising 
national sovereignty.  Nevertheless, when we take a broader view, 
history presents a different landscape.  The Chinese Exclusion Case 
shattered this wishful optimism.  The liberal nature of rights set out 
in Yick Wo does not always trump national sovereignty.  Instead, it 
may be argued that rights can be extended to non-citizen 
immigrants only so long as they are the product of American 
sovereignty. 
 
273 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (stating that the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses apply to all persons, regardless of race, nationality, or citizenship). 
274 See Ulrich K. Preuss, The Force, Frailty, and Future of Human Rights under 
Globalization, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN LAW 283, 295–98 (2000), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol1/iss2/art2 for a discussion of the relationship between 
universal human rights and the Enlightenment. 
275 See supra text accompanying notes 222–34. 
276 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370. 
277 In addition to the strictly procedural character of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses, Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment also provides substantive protection to 
privileges and immunities immanent in citizenship.  See AMAR, supra note 122, at 166.  The 
different effects of procedural and substantive rights also reveal the weakness of universal 
human rights and corroborate the dominance of the popular sovereignty of the United States 
in giving constitutional protection to non-citizens. 
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Perhaps this tension may be explained away because the aliens in 
Yick Wo had entered legally.  Even setting the Chinese Exclusion 
Case aside, however, the history of immigration in the United 
States would still not be pristine.  For example, in the Chinese 
Expulsion Case of 1893,278 the plaintiff, Fong Yue Ting, was also a 
lawful resident alien like the plaintiffs in Yick Wo.  In other words, 
the plausibility of the distinction based on the legality of 
immigrants flounders beyond the narrow confines of Yick Wo and 
the Chinese Exclusion Case. 
One plausible way to distinguish Yick Wo from the Chinese 
Expulsion Case is to argue that Yick Wo focused on the power of 
states over lawful resident aliens, while the Chinese Expulsion Case 
bore on Congress’s power to expel aliens, which was part of the 
plenary power inherent in national sovereignty.279  A consequence of 
this analysis is to categorize Yick Wo as a case concerning the 
power-sharing between the federal and state or local governments, 
while the Chinese Expulsion Case  and the Chinese Exclusion Case  
fall into the category of inherent power. 
In the Chinese Expulsion Case, Justice Stephen Field authored a 
dissent, yet he delivered the majority opinion in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case.  Although both cases dealt with the treatment of 
aliens, Justice Field’s two opinions provided drastically different 
outcomes because of the distinction he drew between expulsion and 
exclusion.280  The difference, for Justice Field, was that in the 
Chinese Exclusion Case, Chae Chang Ping had remained offshore, 
while in the Chinese Expulsion Case, Fong Yue Ting had come onto 
United States soil.281  But even if Chae Chang Ping had entered the 
territorial waters of the United States, nothing would have been 
decided differently.  According to Justice Field’s dissent in the 
Chinese Expulsion Case, even the federal government did not have 
plenary power over the regulation of immigration.282 
 
278 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 746 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing the power to exclude aliens, which is based on national sovereignty, from the 
power to deport lawful residents, which Field characterizes as far more “hostil[e]”).  Justice 
Field’s distinction between exclusion and deportation or expulsion is invoked here to denote 
this case as the Chinese Expulsion Case for the purpose of contrasting it with the familiar 
Chinese Exclusion Case. 
279 See Scaperlanda, supra note 12, at 981–82. 
280 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 746 (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that the power of the 
government to exclude foreigners—to deny them entry—had “never [been] denied”; however, 
the power to deport lawful resident aliens without reason had “never been asserted”). 
281 See id. (Field, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to deport the plaintiff in 
this case). 
282 It has also been argued that Justice Field’s positional change was due to “his oncoming 
senility.”  See Cleveland, supra note 9, at 148. 
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Spatial relations not only define the boundary between the 
internal and the external—the distinction of which is essential to 
the discourse of national sovereignty283—but also demarcate the line 
between exclusion and expulsion.  In line with this logic, the essence 
of Yick Wo was not only the jurisdictional relationship between the 
federal and state or local governments, but also the importance of 
residing within the territory of the United States in cases 
concerning immigration.284 
Justice Field’s dissent in the Chinese Expulsion Case highlighted 
a crucial aspect of immigration in constitutional law—the protection 
of aliens.  Is it possible to embrace the Court’s holding in the 
Chinese Expulsion Case based on the logic of Justice Field’s dissent?  
Can Chinese immigrants domiciled within the territory of the 
Unites States still be “excluded” rather than “expelled?”  The 
answer is yes, and this accords with the internal-external 
distinction set forth by Justice Field.  What differs is that the 
dividing line depends on personal identity rather than on a 
territorial border.  The consequence of this new line is to raze the 
sanctuary established in Yick Wo because the line along personal 
identity contradicts the Yick Wo Court’s universal tone on the 
constitutional protection of aliens. 
The multiplicity of the conceivable internal-external distinctions 
signaled the ability of these distinctions to strike a balance between 
the protection of human rights and national sovereignty in 
immigration.  National sovereignty has been tied to the concept of 
community.285  The internal-external distinction on which the 
discourse of national sovereignty has centered is needed for the 
construction of the political community because it constitutes the 
criteria of membership.  Pushed to this extreme, the limitation of 
universal human rights is exposed and the potential of sovereignty 
looms large.286  Unless our image of communities, especially the 
political community, could create a paradigm shift, universalism of 
human rights cannot be sustained if national sovereignty is pushed 
to its extreme.287 
 
283 See supra notes 252–58 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between 
territoriality and national sovereignty). 
284 See Bosniak, supra note 11, at 979 (stating that aliens have certain rights under the 
Constitution and within domestic courts). 
285 See id. at 961 (stating that even within the internal relations, the application of such 
regulations have differed). 
286 See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 
(Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998) (discussing the fragile position of human beings in the 
face of various kinds of coined distinctions, which is characteristic of sovereignty). 
287 Current literature on the notions of post-national or transnational citizenship largely 
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Perhaps a clearer distinction between the internal and the 
external may be based upon territorial demarcation.  Professor 
Linda S. Bosniak argues that “certain incidents of membership 
attach to persons territorially present in the country . . . .”288  This 
assertion, however, should be viewed with a degree of skepticism.  
The physical line demarcating the boundaries of the United States 
emerged as the result of human imagination rather than by natural 
consequence.  The Chinese Exclusion Case exemplifies the 
tenuousness and ambiguity of the concept of territorial 
boundaries.289  Indistinct spatial sites—territorial waters and 
vessels to name two—are particularly illustrative of the internal-
external relationship. 
Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case reveal the omnipresent 
role played by the internal-external distinction in the 1880s, in 
which the United States was building an image of a sovereign 
nation on both the domestic and the international stages.290  
Although a line separating the internal from the external 
distinguishes these Chinese immigration cases, it is important to 
remain cautious about the variability of such a fault line.  This 
imagined line constantly exists, though manages to elude 
prediction.  The internal-external distinction can explain a great 
deal in hindsight, but there are immense difficulties in foreseeing 
when and where the distinction will emerge.  This is the 
contribution that the area of immigration makes to 
constitutionalism as it clarifies the ambiguous relationship between 
the protection of human rights and national sovereignty.291 
 
constructs avant-garde theses from different phenomena in the world.  Yet these do not 
address the peripheral but insidious possibilities.  See SEYLA BENHABIB, TRANSFORMATIONS 
OF CITIZENSHIP: DILEMMAS OF THE NATION STATE IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (2001); 
SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL?  SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1995); 
YASEMIN NUHOĞLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP: MIGRANTS AND POSTNATIONAL 
MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994); Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 447, 447 (1999) (asserting that citizenship is established through a formal 
political community). 
288 Bosniak, supra note 11, at 974. 
289 The plaintiff in the Chinese Exclusion Case arrived at the Port of San Francisco but did 
not land.  See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582 (describing the plaintiff’s arrival 
and the details of the immigration process in place at the time of his arrival). 
290 See supra notes 138–221 and accompanying text (reviewing the developing sovereignty 
of the United States during the 1880s). 
291 The contribution of peripheral phenomena to scholarship is illuminated by Justice 
Holmes: 
The remoter and more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal 
interest. It is through them that you not only become a great master in your calling, but 
connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its 
unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
As compared to current continental European legal scholarship 
and American political science scholarship at the turn of the 20th 
century, current American legal scholarship pays little attention to 
the role of the state in constitutional development.292  Accordingly, 
broadening our vision to include the role of the state in terms of 
constitutional development serves to enrich our current 
constitutional scholarship.  This is relevant not because of its 
contributions to comparative research or because of pure academic 
interest; rather, its legitimacy rests on the very premise underlying 
the construction of the Unites States.  The United States is more of 
a political construct than one of cultural heritage or ethnic ties.293  
Thus, the state, as the central image of a modern political construct, 
has historically played a tremendous role in the course of American 
constitutional development.  Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion 
Case, when placed in an analytic framework of American nation-
building, are illustrative of the inclusion of the role of the state in 
the scholarship of constitutional law. 
Through the lens of history, the economy and the judiciary have 
played a role in the course of American nation-building.  These two 
dimensions influenced the general development of the American 
constitutional landscape in the 1880s in particular.  As a 
transitional period in the wake of the turbulent Civil War and 
Reconstruction, the 1880s exhibited the dual ambitions of 
consolidating the ideal of a nation in a federalist scheme and also 
burnishing its image as a national sovereign in the imperialist era.  
This presupposition is crucial when reading Yick Wo and the 
Chinese Exclusion Case. 
Finally, by placing both Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case 
in an analytic framework set by the course of American nation-
 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 61, 478 (1897). 
292 From a comparative law perspective, the discipline concerning the role of the ontological 
state in constitutional development is known as allemeine Staatslehre (theory of the state) or 
Staatsrechtswissenshhaft or Staatsrechtslehre (state law theory) in German jurisprudence.  
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293 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 118, at 78 (noting that at the nation’s inception, various 
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note 19, at 59 (establishing that social conditions were critical and even delayed the political 
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building, a suggestion is made to further explore three more 
dimensions: first, for the backward-looking dimension, a new theory 
holds that the Chinese Exclusion Case and Yick Wo resulted from 
the reconstruction of sovereignty implicit in the constitutional 
structure.  Furthermore, the two dimensions of sovereignty were 
the epitome of American nation-building in the 1880s.  This can be a 
helpful guide for scholars examining the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court during that period. 
Second, for the future-oriented dimension, reconstructing Yick Wo 
through the historical lens of American nation-building reveals the 
dynamics of polity and economy.  There exists a relationship 
between regulating economic interests and defining the image of the 
state that casts light on the roles of the economy and the state in 
future constitutional developments.  Economy may know no limits, 
but it can also be a powerful ally of nationalism to redefine national 
boundaries, rather than serving to bring about a borderless utopia. 
Finally, for the dimension of “[t]heory of the state” 
(Staatsrechtswissenschaft),294 the constitutional jurisprudence of 
these two cases and the discourse of sovereignty illustrate the 
particular relationship between constitution-making and state-
founding in the United States.  Because the American Constitution 
preceded the founding of the United States, the original 
constitutional structure did not have a clear mechanism dealing 
with sovereignty.  Thus, issues concerning sovereignty were to 
emerge in subsequent constitutional operations.  Still, this 
characteristic of the configuration of sovereignty, state, and 
constitution in the United States serves to shed light on the avant-
garde experiments of constitutional transformation, sovereignty 
reconstruction, and the development of the concept of community, 
all of which remain in progress.295 
 
 
294 See Dyzenhaus, supra note 292, at 1. 
295 The course of European integration is the most noticeable case.  Professor Weiler 
develops a futurist picture of the relationship between sovereignty, constitution and state. See 
generally J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE (1999).  For the effort to compare 
the experiences of American federalist nation-building and European integration by the 
judiciary, see LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT (2001). 
